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STICKS AND STONES MAY BREAK MY BONES, BUT
YOUR WORDS ARE SURE TO KILL ME: A CASE
NOTE ON UNITED STATES V. ALKHABAZ.*
When we feel, we will feel the emergency:
when we feel the emergency, we will act:
when we act, we will change the world.1
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, under the Supreme Court's constitutional standard,
the regulation of obscenity2 remains the domain of state and local au-
thorities.3 Theoretically, states and municipalities have the ability to
police the retail distribution of obscenity in their jurisdictions.4 How-
ever, the regulation of obscenity has proven problematic given the na-
tional and worldwide distribution of sexually oriented magazines and
videos. Similarly, the advent of the Internet has virtually eliminated
jurisdictional regulation. Thus, it is apparent that only federal regula-
tion of obscenity will have the ability, even theoretically, to regulate
the national distribution of obscenity on the Internet.
The urgent need to regulate obscene speech on the Internet is a
matter of common sense in a nation that claims to value equality. The
imperative need to fight the battle against the continued subordina-
tion of women is a matter of life and death in a nation whose prosper-
ity depends on women.5 An unregulated Internet, and its vast
* Warning: This Note contains sexually graphic material.
The author would like to acknowledge the generous support and insatiable curiosity of her
family and friends.
1. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 91 (1974) (quoting JULIAN BECK, THE LIFE OF THE
THEATER: THE RELATION OF THE ARTIST TO THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE (1972)).
2. See infra notes 88-117 and accompanying text (explaining the standards and general defini-
tion of obscentiy).
3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1973) (recognizing that a "state may regulate [ob-
scene material] without infringing on the First Amendment..
4. Id. at 25.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Who are the Women of the U.S., at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/
intlorg/Status ofWomen/s2.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
The Census Bureau of the United States Department of Commerce provided baseline data
from the 1990 Census for measuring the status of women and for designing policy, legislation,
and programs that have advanced the status of America's women. Id. "The 1990 Census found
historic changes in the characteristics of women: ... women have become a majority of profes-
sional workers." Id. For an expansive view on the percentage of women working in individual
sectors of employment, for example, elective offices, appointive offices, the international public
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capabilities, allows for the subordination of women to continue by
permitting its users to freely transmit obscene speech. The amount of
obscenity transmitted through the Internet is truly abominable. 6 The
fact that the United States Congress has done nothing to curb the
amount of obscenity on the Internet is repugnant and worthy of
criticism.
The United States Congress deserves criticism for not immediately
enacting a federal statute regulating Internet obscenity after the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United
States v. Alkhabaz.7 Jacob Alkhabaz was responsible for various In-
ternet transmissions that described, in sexually explicit detail, plans to
rape, torture, and murder women. 8 The Alkhabaz court did not di-
rectly address the First Amendment issues regarding protected speech
when it analyzed Alkhabaz's e-mail transmissions and Internet sto-
ries. 9 The court ignored, by way of bypassing, all possible First
Amendment issues inherent within Alkhabaz's Internet speech and
strictly declared that the e-mail and Internet stories were mere fanta-
sies and not true threats.' 0 As such, the e-mails and Internet stories
were not violations of Title 18, section 875(c) of the United States
Code (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). 11 The relevant section of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) states that "whoever transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person
or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.' 12
Through a close analysis of the Alkhabaz case, this Note will
demonstrate that there is a dire need for the federal government to
regulate obscenity on the Internet. To better understand the intrica-
cies of obscenity on the Internet, Part II of this Note will provide a
historical background on the Internet and the First Amendment in
sector, the judicial system, the private sector (corporate managers, executive, directors) and the
media, see supra.
6. The effects are antecdotal because there is currently no scientific data linking violence to
obscenity. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
7. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
8. Id. at 1493.
9. See id. ("Accordingly, we decline to address the First Amendment issues raised by the
parties.").
10. Id. at 1493.
11. Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1999). The law that was eventually passed as 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was
first passed in 1932, as Public Law Number 72-274, and criminalized the use of the mails to
transmit a threat to injure or kidnap any person, or to accuse a person of a crime or demand
ransom for a kidnapped person. See H. R. REP. No. 692, at 3, 72 Congress, 1st Sess. (1932).
[Vol. 50:993
UNITED STATES v. ALKHABAZ
relation to obscenity and pornography. 13 Part II will also discuss the
current standards of review for obscenity under the First Amend-
ment.14 Part III will provide a background and full summary of the
Alkhabaz case, including Alkhabaz's "Jane Doe" Story.' 5 Part IV will
analyze both Alkhabaz's e-mails and the "Jane Doe" story, as well as
argue that the court should have concluded that Alkhabaz's e-mails
were obscene speech containing true threats under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). 16 Part V will examine the impact that obscene Internet
transmissions have on women as well as on society as a whole, and
discuss why the United States Congress must produce a federal statute
denying First Amendment protection to obscene speech on the In-
ternet. 17 This part will also provide suggestions on what material the
federal statute should include. 18 Part V will also examine current In-
ternet regulations and the viability of their enforcement. 19 In the fur-
therance of federal regulation, Part VI will question the
constitutionality of a federal statute that would deny all transmissions
of obscenity over the Internet. 20 In conclusion, Part VII of this Note
will explain that the value of obscene materials transmitted through
the Internet that describe the horrid rape, mutilation, and overall sub-
ordination of women does not outweigh the societal costs of inaccessi-
bility to such obscene ideas.21 Thus, this Note will conclude that the
federal government must regulate Internet speech that contains sexu-
ally violent and obscene e-mails and stories.
II. THE INTERNET, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND OBSCENITY:
AN OVERVIEW
Over the past thirty years, technological innovations have revolu-
tionized the way people acquire information and communicate with
others. Through the use of computers and the Internet, people pos-
sess the means for faster and more direct communication.2 2 "Today,
through the use of computers and the Internet, more people than ever
have direct access to an increasing amount of information .... The
13. See infra notes 22-117 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 88-117 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 118-160 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 161-245 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 246-299 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 246-299 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 300-310 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 311-347 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part VII.
22. Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defamation Published by Others:
Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1995).
2001]
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advent of complex information systems ... have made direct commu-
nication between individuals more accessible, more rapid, and more
powerful. '23 This "heightened ability to communicate, '24 however,
has created a new medium for the production and transmission of ob-
scenity. The Internet has revolutionized communication to an extent
utterly unimaginable to the inventors of this complex information sys-
tem, and to the Framers of the United States Constitution who drafted
the First Amendment.
In order to fully examine the application of the First Amendment to
obscene materials on the various mediums of the Internet, such as
newsgroups, bulletin board stories, and private e-mail transmissions,
the operations of the Internet must be analyzed. Furthermore, in or-
der to comprehend the serious impact that obscene materials have on
women and society, the laws regulating our freedom of speech, and in
particular, the law in regard to obscenity, must be brought to light and
fully examined.
A. The Internet
In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, the United States De-
partment of Defense (Defense Department) questioned whether mili-
tary orders could "be issued to the armed forces if the United States
were ravaged by a nuclear attack. '25 As a result, in 1966, the Defense
Department's Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) intro-
duced ARPAnet as the first transcontinental, high-speed computer
network built and developed to link communications among military
installations and to survive a nuclear exchange. 26 In 1969, ARPA ex-
panded the scope of ARPAnet, introducing its viability and applica-
tion to universities, defense contractors, and research laboratories. 27
This network soon became a vast information superhighway, referred
to as the Internet. 28 Thirty years later, the Internet community ex-
23. Id. at 248-49.
24. Id. at 248.
25. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62.
26. lan C. Ballon, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 547 PLI/PAT 169, 177 (1999); Taylor,
supra note 22, at 251; Sudha Nagargi, Hacking: Dangerous Liaison, COMPUTERS TODAY, Apr.
30, 1999, at 46. "The Internet developed from a project conceived in 1966 by Bob Taylor, the
director of the Computer Research Program at the United States Department of Defense's Ad-
vanced Research Project Agency .... Ballon, supra, at 177. Nonetheless, the inventor of the
Internet may still be in dispute. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 25, at 62.
27. Taylor, supra note 22, at 251; Nagargi, supra note 26, at 46.
28. Taylor, supra note 22, at 251.
[Vol. 50:993
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panded beyond government and academic use and is now used by
over 200 million people worldwide. 29
The Internet provides its users with a wide range of communication
possibilities. For example, users30 can receive e-mail, 31 participate in
chat lines, 32 and access the Internet's system of news and discussion
groups known as Usenet. 33 Usenet is a public collection of electronic
discussion groups, usually referred to as newsgroups. 34 The new-
sgroups serve as electronic bulletin boards (BBS) 35 for users to post
universally accessible messages or articles, including questions, an-
swers, and general information.36 There are approximately 76,000 In-
29. The Dawn of e-Life, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 41. The United States alone has ap-
proximately 80 million people using the Internet. Id. See also Ballon, supra note 26, at 178
(discussing the increase of individuals using the Internet throughout the past decade). Although
it is difficult to obtain the exact number of Internet users, approximately 25 million individuals
had access to the Internet in mid-1994, and the audience then was predicted to double each year.
Id. In September 1995, a survey concluded that there were only 5.8 million individual Internet
users in the United States in addition to 3.9 million commercial users. Id. In 1996, however, it
was estimated that there were more than 26.7 million people using a web browser. Id. Further-
more, in 1998, a survey "concluded that by the year 2000 more than 50 million people would be
online, or alternatively as many as 142 million worldwide (including 71 million in the United
States)." Id. It should be noted that the number of individuals with access to the Internet has
already surpassed the projections. Id.
30. There are two types of users: (1) professional, and (2) "end users." This Note will discuss
"end-users," individuals who are "without much technical knowledge of information technology
who use computers for entertainment, education, or work related tasks." USING INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS & COMMUNICATIONS 10 (Brian K.
Williams et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997)[hereinafter USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY]. "An informa-
tion technology professional [user] is a person who has a formal education in the technical as-
pects of using a computer-and-communications system." Id.
31. Id. at 26 (defining e-mail as "a software-controlled system that links computers by wired
or wireless connections ... allow[ing] users, through their keyboards, to post messages and to
read responses on their computer screens"). The second most convenient way for people to
communicate across state lines is by e-mail. Id. Forty-six percent of Americans send or receive
e-mail everyday. See Jared Sandberg, Losing Your Good Name Online, NEWSWEEK, Sept, 20,
1999, at 57. E-mail is convenient, saves time, brings people closer together, and helps people
manage their complex lives. See Andrew Leonard, We've Got Mail-Always, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
20, 1999, at 58. E-mail aids its users in writing books, conducting political campaigns, and com-
mitting crimes. Id.
32. See USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 30 at 341. Chat lines, otherwise
known as chat rooms, are discussion areas in which a user may participate with others in a real-
time conversation through keyboard use with the collective chat room conversation scrolling
across the screen. Id.
33. HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 158-60 (1994).
Usenet is an abbreviation for "users network." Id. at 161.
34. Id. at 161; USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 30, at 348 (defining newsgroups
as "electronic discussions held by groups of people focusing on a specific topic"). See also Tay-
lor, supra note 22, at 253.
35. "A electronic bulletin board system (BBS) is a centralized information source and mes-
sage switching system for a particular computer-linked interest group. A BBS is usually run by a
sysop, or system operator." USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 30, at 342.
36. See id. at 348.
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ternet sites that collect and organize Usenet's newsgroup messages,
while Usenet itself "boasts more that 11,000 newsgroups. ' 37 Most ar-
ticles posted on Usenet newsgroups are not screened, thus, there are
no restrictions or regulations by which to abide.38 "A user may send
an article to a moderated group in the same way as an unmoderated
group," however, a moderated newsgroup employs the aid of modera-
tors to determine and edit what articles will be posted via e-mail.39
The role of the moderator is to read every user transmitted article and
determine whether it meets certain predetermined requirements of
the newsgroup. 40 The moderator has the ability to edit or ultimately
refuse to post an article that does not meet these requirements. 41
A BBS "is a centralized information source and message switching
system for a particular computer linked interest group. ' 42 Most BBSs
are not easy to access because they require the subscriber to pay a fee
by credit card and receive a password in order to upload or download
certain data or post messages on relevant databases.43
The available information acquired through Usenet and BBSs are
only two of the many explanations for the dramatic increase in In-
ternet users. The Internet is a convenient, simple, and affordable
route of communication, opening access to a seemingly infinite
amount of knowledge. In addition, computer networks abolish the
limits of geography, as well as the laws and regulations that are man-
dated within a particular geographical and legal jurisdiction.44 The
37. Taylor, supra note 22, at 253.
38. Taylor, supra note 22, at 254 (explaining the process of getting an article printed or posted
on a moderated newsgroup). See also HAHN & STOUT, supra note 33, at 175.
39. Taylor, supra note 22, at 254.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 33, at 27 (noting that a BBS is a repository system for
messages devoted to a particular topic).
43. Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and Political Impli-
cations of Cybersmut, Virtual Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 13
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 339 (1997). Bilstad explains that after the
user has paid the fee and obtained a password, he can gain access to a BBS by calling a separate
number with his modem and communications software. Id. Therefore, it is implied that "BBSs
are not areas of the Internet that one can just stumble onto." Id.
44. MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS 8 (1998). But see Pamela A. Huelster, Note, Cybersex and
Community Standards, 75 B.U. L. REV. 865, 876 (1995) (noting that in regard to issues of obscen-
ity in electronic services such as BBSs, the community standard the court or jury must apply is
that of the BBS provider, in other words, where the service originates). Some commentators
state that "all of the users of a particular bulletin board service form a community," thus imply-
ing that the community standard the court should apply is that of the entire world, because the
bulletin board is potentially accessible to anyone worldwide. Id.
[Vol. 50:993
2001] UNITED STATES v. ALKHABAZ 999
unregulated and limitless geographic domain of the Internet 45 allows
users to experience an amorphous social freedom when they commu-
nicate. Internet users are allowed to communicate without their as-
signed social attributes of sex, race, or other characteristics of
inequality, and remain anonymous, if they desire.46 Anonymity and
the social freedom provided by the safe harbor of cyberspace permits
users to explore and speak without restraint on topics considered ta-
boo in the real world. 47
These forbidden or socially taboo acts of expression are not under-
stood within the Internet's infrastructure. 48 The Internet's infrastruc-
ture allows every user to build a range of information services and
forums of expression and association. 4 9 Since the Internet is built on
the philosophy of openness and free communication, "its users hold
the potential to change not only how [they] get things done, but [also
their] thinking patterns and behaviors" regardless of whether the
45. Cyberspace is defined as "a virtual reality comprised of electronic data and information
... [and] is generally accessed through a computer and seen through a video display or other
visual output device." Taylor, supra note 22, at 250 n.16. Cyberspace has also been defined as
"the computer online world and the Internet in particular, but it is also used to refer to the whole
wired and wireless world of communications in general." USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 30, at 333. When the term "cyberspace" is mentioned in this Note, it is meant to refer
to the Internet in particular so as to demonstrate the vast amount of connections and interac-
tions available to computer users.
46. Margaret Chon, Symposium: Towards a Radical and Plural Democracy: Radical Plural
Democracy and the Internet, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 143, 143 (1997); Timothy Zick, Congress, The
Internet, and the Intractable Pornography Problem: The Child Online Protection Act of 1998, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1147, 1158 (1999). "In cyberspace, we have the ability to hide absolutely
who we are. Thus, '[c]yberspace is a place that maximizes both social and individual plasticity,
which means it is a place that determines very little about what others must know about you."'
Id.
47. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July, 3, 1995, at 38. "Cyber-
space is a safe place in which to explore the forbidden and the taboo .... It offers the possibility
for genuine, unembarrassed conversation about accurate as well as fantasy images of sex." Id. at
45. The idea that particular topics of conversation are taboo has decreased over the past decade,
although there is one area of conversation that is still widely considered "taboo" by members of
society. Gad Horowitz and Michael Kaufman note in their article Male Sexuality: Toward A
Theory of Liberation, that the attraction to pornography is in itself the attraction to conversation
that is socially taboo, the expressed idea of male dominance and female subservience is often
considered taboo. Gad Horowitz & Michael Kaufman, Male Sexuality: Toward A Theory of Lib-
eration, in BEYOND PATRIARCHY: ESSAYS BY MEN ON PLEASURE, POWER, AND CHANGE 81, 98
(1987).
48. Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 465, 466 (1997). Goodman comments on how the Internet's infrastructure, which is com-
posed of electronic bits which have no color, size, or weight, and travel at the speed of light, does
not understand its users' acts of expression. Id. Nonetheless, millions of these electronic bits
represent atom-based objects or analog forms of information such as speech and are clearly
understood by the human brain. Id.
49. GODWIN, supra note 44, at 8.
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changes are for the better or the worse.50 Yet, despite the Internet's
vast size, increasing usage worldwide, and ability to influence its users,
the Internet remains largely unregulated. Therefore, along with intro-
ducing a new medium of communication, the Internet provides a
unique forum for the distribution of obscenity and other forms of hate
speech. 51
B. The Shield of the First Amendment
The United States Constitution's most majestic guarantee provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances. ''52 Historically, courts have rarely strayed from according the
First Amendment preferred treatment because it restrains the govern-
ment's power to limit the freedom of expression based on the mes-
sage, idea, subject matter, or content of speech regardless of how
repugnant it may be. 53 Some American historians and legal scholars
believe that the development of First Amendment jurisprudence be-
gan with several cases in the early Twentieth Century.54 During this
period, shortly after World War I, the courts were faced with a num-
ber of cases brought under the Espionage Act 55 of 1917.
50. The Dawn of e-Life, supra note 29, at 41.
51. Taylor, supra note 22, at 249. See also John Leland, More Buck for the Bang, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 20, 1999, at 61 (commenting on how adult Internet sites were a one billion dollar industry
in 1998 and that more than one-half of all requests made on Internet search engines are adult-
oriented).
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
53. See e.g. Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 689 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (questioning
whether the movie Natural Born Killers is protected speech "because it falls into two of the
exceptions to the First Amendment guarantee of free speech: the obscenity exception and the
incitement to imminent lawless activity exception").
54. Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 n.19
(1993) (noting that the "development of modern First Amendment doctrine began with several
cases ... that interpreted ... the Espionage Act of 1917..."). But see David M. Rabban, The
Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History,
45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (1992) (illustrating that the assumption that the Espionage Act of
1917 provoked the first modern controversy over free speech is incorrect because, through the
investigation of the pre-war period, "controversies over free speech arose in an enormous vari-
ety of settings, ranging from the activities of political radicals to disputes over commercial and
movie censorship").
55. The Espionage Act of 1917 stated that the constitutional freedom of speech and press was
not infringed by the provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917 under which
convictions may be had for conspiring when the United States was at war with Ger-
many, unlawfully to utter, write, and publish disloyal, scurrilous, and abusive language
about the form of government of the United States, or language intended to bring the
form of government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and disre-
[Vol. 50:9931000
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Nonetheless, the dominant justification for the special protections
guaranteed by the First Amendment freedom of speech is the belief
that a free marketplace of ideas will foster liberty and democracy.56
Similarly, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty defends the concept underly-
ing the freedom of speech and the marketplace of ideas by arguing
that allowing all speech into the marketplace, both good and bad, will
result in the discovery of truth.5 7 Despite the fact that a free market-
place of ideas will often permit the communication of information that
may endanger society, courts have found that a free marketplace of
ideas will serve liberty well and therefore outweighs the costs that so-
ciety will undoubtedly endure as a result of the dangerous speech.58
Many courts have reasoned that it would be dangerous for a demo-
cratic government to decide what speech is permissible.
The United States Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech
is not an absolute right, despite the plain language and absolute tone
of the First Amendment. 59 The Court has realized that regardless of
the absolute language of the First Amendment, the "Framers did not
intend to provide constitutional protection for false testimony [given]
under oath, or for oral contracts that are against public policy, such as
pute, or intend to incite, provoke, and encourage resistance to the United States in said
war or unlawfully and willfully, by utterance, writing, printing, and publication, to urge,
incite, and advocate curtailment of production of things necessary and essential to the
prosecution of the war.
40 Stat. 451 (1917); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616 (1919). For a short and precise
historical account of President Woodrow Wilson's 1917 Espionage Act, see Paul Murphy, Espio-
nage Act, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 652-53 (1986).
56. For a discussion of the marketplace theory, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (maintaining that "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market").
57. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM (Bantam Classic Books) (1993)
(discussing the importance of a free market and exchange of ideas in a democratic society).
58. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1943). The Chaplinsky Court recog-
nized that the right to free speech was not absolute under all circumstances:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). But see The Honorable John Paul Stevens, The Freedom
of Speech, Address at the Yale Law School as the Inaugural Ralph Gregory First Amendment
Lecture (Oct. 27, 1992), 102 YALE L. J. 1293, 1295-96 (1993) ("The plain language of the First
Amendment indicates that the Framers intended to establish a rule of absolute immunity.").
However, Justice Stevens realized that the First Amendment is rarely understood in such a way
as to protect all speech. See id. at 1296.
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wagers or conspiracies ... to fix prices."'60 In addition, recently estab-
lished case law has held that speech aiding and abetting criminal activ-
ity does not enjoy First Amendment protection since the
"[a]mendment has never been understood to protect all oral commu-
nication, no matter how unlawful, threatening, or vulgar it may be."'61
Other examples of speech not protected by the First Amendment are
fighting words, 62 gross libel,63 unlawful agreements, 64 and defama-
tion.65 As these examples suggest, the type of speech that is often
unprotected by the First Amendment can be characterized as harmful.
Nonetheless, the First Amendment protects political and societal
opinions that are portrayed through pornographic material, however,
such protection does not extend to those ideas demonstrated in ob-
scene materials. 66 Obscenity and pornography differ, not only in their
definitions, but also in the court's standard of review.67
60. Stevens, supra note 59, at 1296. See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982) (reaf-
firming the idea that agreements to engage in illegal conduct may be banned by the state without
entrenching on any First Amendment right, thus the ability to illegally exchange goods for pri-
vate profit may be prohibited).
61. Rice v. Paladine Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Stevens, supra note 59, at
1296.
62. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (claiming that fighting words "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"). Fighting words do not play an
integral part of the exposition of ideas in a community and have such a low amount of social
value that a society's interests in morality and order are more important. Id. See also
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941) (stating that free speech
guarantees do not apply to some classes of speech because the utterance of such words injures
listeners and may breach the peace). Chafee commented on the fact that fighting words do not
offer listeners the ability to engage in counter-arguments and that "the harm is done as soon as
they are communicated, or is liable to follow almost immediately in the form of retaliatory vio-
lence." Id. at 150.
63. For an extensive review of the cases regarding the protection of gross libelous speech see
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 132-156 (1999).
64. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1982). The mere fact that an unlawful agree-
ment is composed of speech (i.e., words) does not automatically confer upon it the immunities
granted by the First Amendment. Id. at 55.
65. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public figure may
hold a speaker liable for damage to one's reputation caused by publication of a defamatory
falsehood if the statement was made with actual malice, or in other words, with the knowledge
that the statement was false or made with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was
true or false). See also Byers, 712 So. 2d at 689.
66. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. In Chaplinsky, the Court explained that lewd and ob-
scene utterances are not an essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social
value that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. Id.
67. See generally James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1159
(1993) (noting that the concept of pornography differs from that of obscenity). "Obscenity [is
defined] as dirty sexual matter that lacks value, while pornography [is defined] as explicit sexual
material that harms women." Id. Pornography includes "currently constitutionally protected
works with literary or social value." Id.
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1. Pornography and the First Amendment
There is no one accepted definition of pornography, however, por-
nography is most commonly defined as graphic, sexually explicit work,
which the dissemination of, in context, tends to subordinate women.68
Pornographic materials include depictions of sexualized rape, battery,
sexual torture, and prostitution or servility.69 In short, pornography
propagates the societal promotion and political legitimatization of the
continued sexual subordination of women. 70
Notwithstanding the impact that pornography has on women, the
United States Supreme Court has held that pornographic speech is
protected by the First Amendment. 1 The Court, based on its inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, has not yet found justification for
denying pornography protection, and continues to state that the qual-
ity of speech "cannot be invoked as a basis for government control
68. This is the definition relied upon in this Note. See also ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRA-
PHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 128 (1989) [hereinafter PORNOGRAPHY]. The MacKinnon-Dwor-
kin model definition of pornography states as follows:
Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pic-
tures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following: (i) women are
presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are
presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented
as sexual objects who experience pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented
as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v)
women are presented in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or women's
body parts - including but not - limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks - are exhib-
ited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vi) women are presented as
whores by nature; or (vii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals;
or (viii) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filth
or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
Id. See also Catharine MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146, 146 n.1
(1987); Myrna Kostash, Second Thoughts, in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 32, 34 (1985). Kos-
tash defined
[p]ornography [als a presentation, whether live, simulated, verbal, pictorial, filmed or
videotaped, or otherwise represented, of sexual behaviour in which one or more par-
ticipants are coerced, overtly or implicitly, into participation; or are injured or abused
physically or psychologically; or in which an imbalance of powers is obvious, or implied
by virtue of the immature age of any participant or by contextual aspects of the presen-
tation, and in which such behaviour can be taken to be advocated or endorsed.
Id.
69. PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 68, at 128 (examining the MacKinnon-Dworkin model defini-
tion of pornography).
70. Catharine MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 325, 325 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 1994).
71. Thomas I. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacK-
innon, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130, 130-39 (1984) (addressing MacKinnon's theory that por-
nography is "central to the institutionalization of male dominance" and proceeds upon the
premise that pornography plays a role in societal male supremacy).
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.... "72 In American Booksellers Association Incorporated v. Hudnut,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, holding that
pornographic speech was protected by the First Amendment.73
In Hudnut, the Indianapolis City Council enacted a version of An-
drea Dworkin's and Catharine MacKinnon's 1983 Minneapolis anti-
pornography ordinance that defined pornography as discrimination
against women.74 The ordinance prohibited sexually-explicit speech
that treated women in a disapproved way, as submissive or humiliated
72. Emerson, supra note 71, at 132-33 ("The state must seek to achieve its social goals by
methods other than the suppression of expression."). It is interesting to note that Emerson
based his argument on the belief that the Framers did not intend the First Amendment to allow
the government to prohibit all speech that supported male domination. Id. at 130-33. But see
Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 975, 1025 (1993). Professor Becker argues that at the time of the Framers and the creation
of the Constitution "[W]omen, though a majority group, did not participate in the relevant con-
stitutional moments .... Women were excluded entirely from the drafting of the original Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights and were only rarely admitted to significant discussions. Indeed, at
these most basic constitutional moments, [as a matter of social policy] women were not permit-
ted to speak in public." Id. This fact begs the question of whether the First Amendment should
in fact continue to be interpreted by looking at the "framers' intent" since it can be argued that
the framers' intent is seriously outdated.
73. 771 F.2d 323, affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
74. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324. The ordinance was built upon Dworkin's work opposing pornog-
raphy and MacKinnon's women's rights background. Lindgren, supra note 67, at 1156. Dworkin
and MacKinnon created a civil rights statute that allowed women to sue purveyors of pornogra-
phy. "A version of the statute was adopted by the Minneapolis City Council in 1983 and 1984,
but [was] later vetoed by liberal mayor Donald Fraser." Id. at 1156. The Minneapolis statute
reads as follows:
Pornography is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.
(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being
raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks-are
exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy
or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
(2) The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in (1)( i-ix) above
is pornography for purposes of subsections (1)(p) of this statute.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139.20(gg) (passed Dec 30. 1983; vetoed
Jan. 5, 1984). See also Randall D. B. Tigue, Civil Rights and Censorship-Incompatible Bedfel-
lows, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 85 n.24 (1985) (arguing that the ordinance and "its substan-
tive provisions could be used to combat pornography").
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in sexual activity, regardless of any positive attributes of the work. 75
However, the city ordinance permitted sexually-explicit speech that
treated women in the approved way, as an equal to her sex partner,
notwithstanding its explicitness.76 The Seventh Circuit struck down
the anti-pornography ordinance as unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated "on the ground of the content of the speech. '77
The Seventh Circuit stressed the danger of allowing a state to or-
dain preferred viewpoints.78 The court explained that the Constitu-
tion forbids a state to declare one perspective of speech "holy," while
silencing the opposite viewpoint. 79 For example, speech dealing with
the pernicious beliefs of Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan has historically
been considered part and parcel of the impassioned criticism of laws,
policies, and government which is indispensable in a free society, and
cannot be banned even though it advocates hate and violence. 80 Fur-
ther, allowing the government to regulate speech on the basis of con-
tent, would be a step toward a totalitarian government. 81 The court
emphasized that the absolute right to propagate opinions that may be
wrong or hateful was the key distinction between a free democracy
and a totalitarian regime.82 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the Seventh Circuit's decision without comment.83
The Hudnut court accepted the premise that pornography exploits,
subordinates, and furthers aggression and harm against women in the
75. Id.
76. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
77. Id. See also Lindgren, supra note 67, at 1156 (discussing how the Indianapolis statute,
signed by Mayor William Hudnut, was struck down by the Seventh Circuit, and affirmed without
comment by the United States Supreme Court). But see Catharine MacKinnon, Speech, Equal-
ity, and Harm: The Case Against Pornography, in THE PRICE WE PAY 301, 303 (Laura J. Lederer
& Richard Delgado, eds., 1995) (asserting that Hudnut is an ideological barrier to the ordinance
becoming law). MacKinnon claimed that the Hudnut decision gave "rise to the belief that the
equality approach is unconstitutional" and in violation of the First Amendment. See id. Thus,
Hudnut would never deem sex discrimination harmful enough to outweigh free speech. Id. Fur-
thermore, the Hudnut decision departed from the ruling that "sex discriminatory child pornogra-
phy is protected speech, when all child pornography is already constitutionally criminal." Id.
Thus implying that under Hudnut, a child may not sue a perpetrator for civil damages. Id.
78, Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 328-30 (demonstrating the political power of pornography by comparing it to
Hitler's propaganda and communist views). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-49
(1969) (holding that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments). In Brandenburg, the plaintiff, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, was wrongfully
convicted under the Ohio statute for advocating criminal behavior as a means of political reform.
Id. at 444. The Court held that the statute violated the plaintiff's rights to assembly and free
speech. Id. at 449 n.4.
81. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
82. Id. at 328-29.
83. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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home, work place, and society. 84 Nonetheless, the court held that por-
nography is, for those very reasons, powerful political speech, and
therefore protected by the First Amendment.8 5 The marketplace of
ideas affects how people view the world, form opinions regarding
politics and social ideals, influence change in their culture, and shape
their socialization.8 6 Therefore, since the Court has held pornography
to be political speech, within the marketplace of ideas, it is likely that
pornography will continue to be protected by the First Amendment,
and ultimately by the Supreme Court, until it can be proven that por-
nographic material produces a grave and imminent danger to
women.
87
2. The History of Obscenity and the First Amendment
Throughout the history of the legal system, courts have assumed
that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment. 88 The cur-
rent approach to obscenity is delineated in three landmark cases: the
84. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 "Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination
[which] in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and
rape in the streets." Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. For the historical use of pornography in
political and religious debates, see Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography, and
Free Speech, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (1994). Professor Wolfson examined the use of pornogra-
phy from the year 1500 to the end of the French Revolution when pornography was linked with
serious political and religious change and revolution. See id. at 1055. In addition, Professor
Wolfson noted the time as one in which "political and literary subversives used pornography as
an effective weapon against the aristocracy, monarchy, and clergy." See id. See also LYNN
HUNT, INTRODUCTION TO THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY 329-345 (1993) (explaining her
theory that democracy was implemented against the monarchy through the use of pornography
and the feminization of the aristocracy). This implementation accelerated through the use of
horrid pornographic attacks against the queen. Id. It is ironic, as Hunt noted, that the porno-
graphic depictions of women erased the monarchy and yet were in the end excluded from the
democracy that their humiliation helped create. Id.
87. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-449 (maintaining that the constitutional guarantees of
free speech do not permit a state to forbid advocacy of the use of force or violation of the law
except where advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless activity). See also
Rice, 128 F.3d at 242; Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020; United States v. Freemen, 761 F.2d 549, 551-52
(9th Cir. 1985); Byers, 712 So.2d at 689 (stating that the First Amendment does not protect
classes of speech that are obscene, slanderous, an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute, or directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action which is likely to
incite or enact such action). Whether pornography, in fact, enacts grave and imminent danger to
members of society will not be addressed in this Note. However, for an extensive review of
pornography and its impact on women, see Lindgren, supra note 67, at 1153.
88. See Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Regina v.
Hicklin 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
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British case Regina v. Hicklin,89 and the American cases Roth v.
United States90 and Miller v. California.91
Regina v. Hicklin, a Nineteenth Century British case, was given
great consideration by the American courts in defining obscenity. 92 In
Hicklin, the issue was whether anti-religious pamphlets which in-
cluded references to intercourse and discussed the sexual nature of
questions asked by priests were obscene. 93 In this case, Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn set forth the first test used by the Queen's Bench to
judge obscenity. 94 The Hicklin test questions "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall." 95 The Queen's Bench found
that the pamphlets were calculated to produce a pernicious effect on
its readers, depraving and debauching their minds, and were there-
fore, obscene.96 The early American courts adopted the Hicklin test,
and its wide usage "led to the passage of numerous statutes concern-
ing obscene materials in this country. '97
In 1957, amidst the standards of review brought forth by various
courts, the United States Supreme Court refined the definition of ob-
scenity in Roth v. United States.98 In Roth, the Court held that obscen-
ity did not have First Amendment protection,99 and that the federal
89. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 360 (1868). See also Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (1663) (considered
the first reported obscenity case). Cf. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815)
(considered the first reported obscenity case in the United States); United States v. Bennett, 24
F. Cas. 1093, 1104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) No. 14571 (noting to be one of the first cases in the
United States to refer to the obscenity test noted in Hicklin).
90. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
91. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
92. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 658 (1978). See also P.
Heath Brockwell, Comment, Grappling With Miller v. California: The Search for an Alternative
Approach to Regulating Obscenity, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 131, 131 (1993) (describing how American
courts adopted the original obscenity test from Hicklin).
93. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 362-63.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 371. See also Parmellee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (ques-
tioning whether the book 'Nudism in Modern Life' was obscene in the light of the obscenity test
set forth and applied in Hicklin).
96. Id. See also United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) No. 14571
(relying on Hicklin).
97. Brockwell, supra note 92, at 131. Although the American courts adopted the Hicklin test,
it has since been repudiated and the struggle to regulate obscenity with a sound and constitu-
tional standard continues. Hicklin was the foundation upon which our current standard of re-
view rests. However, the Roth Court rejected Hicklin because it judged "obscenity by the effect
of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons" thus, it was "unconstitutionally restric-
tive of the freedoms of speech and press." Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
98. Brockwell, supra note 92, at 133.
99. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492-93.
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statute, which punished the sending of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or
filthy materials" through the mail, was constitutional. 100 Justice Wil-
liam Brennan explained that obscene material is "material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient'01 interests," is patently
offensive, and lacks serious value.102 Furthermore, the Court held
that the issue of whether material is obscene should be determined by
asking if the average person, within the present day standards of the
community, would consider the dominant theme of the material, as a
whole, appealing to prurient interests. 0 3 The Roth Court reiterated
the Twentieth Century notion that all ideas, even those of trivial social
importance, have the full protection of the First Amendment, how-
ever, the Court maintained that obscenity is outside the realm of pro-
tection since it damages the traditional moral fabric of society.10 4
The Court's current standard of review for obscenity was intro-
duced in Miller v. California.05 In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren
Burger, the Court affirmed a conviction based on conduct that was in
violation of a state statute that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly
distribute obscene matter.'0 6 The defendant had conducted a mass
mailing campaign, in which he mailed unsolicited brochures contain-
100. Id. at 493. Roth conducted a business publicizing the sale of books, photographs, and
magazines and used circulars to solicit sales of products that were obscene and thus, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1461. Id. at 480. In short, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 provides that obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, or indecent material is unmailable, and that whoever knowingly deposits such mate-
rial for mailing or delivery is criminally punishable. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994).
101. Although there is much debate in regard to the definition of prurient, the most common
definition of prurient material is that which incites lasciviousness or lust. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Furthermore, in Roth v. United States and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, the Court held that
prurience could be constitutionally defined "as that which appeals to a shameful or morbid inter-
est in sex." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
102. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
103. Id. at 490. For the purpose of simplicity, the Roth Court assumed that the community is
composed of the twelve jurors. In his jury instruction, the trial judge in Roth stated as follows:
[L]adies and gentlemen of the jury, you ... are the exclusive judges of what the com-
mon conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience you are to
consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the relig-
ious and irreligious-men, women, and children.
Id. at 490. See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 33-34 (holding "that the jury evaluate the materials with
reference to 'contemporary standards of the State .... '). The Miller Court upheld a statewide
definition of community which prohibited the use of a national standard on the ground that "it
[was] neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept a public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City." Id. at 32. For further instruction on what constitutes community
standards see Huelster, supra note 44, at 865-88.
104. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. See also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (maintaining that the social
interest in order and morality may outweigh certain types of speech).
105. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
106. Id. at 16 (holding that Miller violated California Penal Code § 311.2(a)). In 1969, section
311.2(a) of the California Penal Code read in relevant part as follows:
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ing pictures and drawings depicting sexual activities, to advertise the
sale of illustrated adult books.10 7 In examining these brochures, the
question presented to the Court was whether the mailed material was
obscene and could, therefore, be regulated by the states without vio-
lating the First Amendment.10 8
The Miller Court determined whether material should be consid-
ered obscene by applying a three-prong test (Miller test). 10 9 Under
the Miller test, the trier of fact must ask whether:
(a) the 'average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards,' 10 would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interests;"' (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive" 2 way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law, [as written or authoritatively construed]; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value; [there is no requirement that the
material must be shown to be utterly without redeeming social
value.] 13
The Miller Court used this test to affirm the lower courts decision,
despite a powerful dissent by Justices William Brennan and William
Douglas, and held that alleged obscene materials may only be upheld
as constitutional under the First Amendment standards concurrently
established." 4 Thus, the Miller test provided fair notice to purveyors
of obscene materials that First Amendment protections would not be
granted to materials which fall within its boundaries. 1 5 Furthermore,
Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting or possessing
within the state (a) every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or
causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares,
publishes, prints, exhibits, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with the intent
to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene material is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 1969). See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 16 n.1 (recognizing that
the offense was prior to June 25, 1969, when section 311.2(a) was amended).
107. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16. The brochures advertised four books respectfully titled "Inter-
course," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography."
Id. at 18. In addition, there was a movie entitled "Marital Intercourse." Id. The brochures and
the movies explicitly and sexually depicted pictures of "men and women in groups of two or
more engaging in a variety of sexual activities with genitals often prominently displayed." Id.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
112. "Offensiveness must be assessed under the standards of the community. Both offensive-
ness and an appeal to something other than 'normal, healthy, sexual desires' are essential ele-
ments of obscenity." Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324 (citations omitted).
113. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. For problems concerning the Miller test, see Brockwell, supra note
92, at 136-39 (addressing the vagueness and shortcomings of the Miller test).
114. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37 (holding that obscene materials will be subject to the Miller test).
115. Id. at 27.
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the Miller Court stressed the notion that obscene speech be regulated
by states, subject only to the three standards enumerated within the
test. The Miller test continues to apply today and has become one of
the more influential doctrines in First Amendment jurisprudence.' 16
Unfortunately, when a court decides a case on grounds other than ob-
scenity, the Miller test is inapplicable.' 17
III. UNITED STATES V. ALKHABAZ
Defendant Jacob Alkhabaz a was a twenty year old linguistics ma-
jor at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, when his
"repellently misogynistic"' 1 9 e-mails shocked the nation.1 20 Alkhabaz
was a consistent and loyal contributor of sadistic stories to the In-
ternet, via Usenet electronic BBSs.121 Alkhabaz's e-mails chronicled
in detail the desire to engage in the actual bondage, torture, humilia-
tion, mutilation, rape, sodomy, and murder of women and young
girls.' 22 The investigation of Alkhabaz was triggered when his e-mails
and Internet stories traveled across the Internet's intercontinental in-
formation superhighway, with the aid of the Internet's public BBSs 123
and Usenet, 24 to a sixteen year old girl in Moscow.' 25 On January 18,
1995, the girl's father sent one of Alkhabaz's stories to a University of
Michigan alumnus, who reported the story to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).' 26
116. Bilstad, supra note 43, at 367.
117. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
118. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used the defendant's legal
name, Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan used Alkhabaz's preferred name, Jake Baker, as an alias during the trial
proceeding. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995); United States v.
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). United States v. Alkhabaz is often referred to as the
Jake Baker case, however, for consistency, this Note will refer to the case as Alkhabaz, and to
him as Alkhabaz throughout.
119. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497. (Krupansky. J., dissenting) (characterizing Alkhabaz's arti-
cles as misogynistic because they "evince[d] an extreme and morbid fascination with the concept
of the physical and psychological abuse and torment of women and young girls, described in
lurid detail, and often culminating in murder").
120. GODWIN, supra note 44, at 119.
121. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
122. Id. at 1498 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
123. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (describing BBSs).
124. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (describing Usenet).
125. GODWIN, supra note 44, at 120.
126. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1498 (Krupansky, J., dissenting); GODWIN, supra note 44, at 120-21
(chronicling the case's triggering events: the sixteen year old girl in Moscow read Alkhabaz's
story, and told her father about it, her father in turn told his friend Richard DuVal, who was by
coincidence a University of Michigan alumnus, who then called up his alma mater and
complained).
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A. The Jane Doe Story2 7
People can only recognize the impact that Internet obscenity has on
the actions, behaviors, and opinions of our nation's citizens when they
are confronted with the obscene material itself. The ability to demon-
strate the intense and horrifying effect obscenity has on women is only
possible when readers are confronted with obscene material and are
able to picture or imagine themselves as the victim. The Jane Doe
Story, about a woman in Alkhabaz's class, is an example of
Alkhabaz's perverse and obscene desires, and reads as follows:
The premise is that my friend Jerry and I have broken into the
apartment of a girl I know. (I = the protagonist). She is shaking
with terror as Jerry and I circle her. She'd [sic] almost completely
nude now-we've made her take off all of her clothes except for her
bra and panties. As Jerry and I pass by her, we reach out and feel
her velvety flesh, caress her breasts and ass through her underwear.
Jerry and I snap pictures of her tiny trembling body from all angles.
She says in a terrified voice, "why are you doing this . . . I've
never hurt you ... p-please stop!" I pause in front of her. Jerry
smiles at her terror. He laughs at her pitiful pleas. I say "Shut the
fuck up, stupid whore!" and hit the side of her head, hard. She col-
lapses onto the ground, crying, curling up into a little ball.
"Alright. Let's have some fun!"
I yank her up by the hair and force her hands behind her back. I
quickly get them restrained with duck [sic] tape. Her little body
struggles against me as she screams for help. Jerry tears off her
panties and shoves them into her delicious mouth, securing them
with a tight strip of rope. She'd [sic] still struggling, screaming into
the makeshift gag. I let her drop, to take pictures of her as she
struggles. As she's fighting there on the carpet, eyes wide with fear,
Jerry and I strip. Jerry's got a hard on. I've got a hard on. We
laugh.
I grab her bra and rip it off her. Holding her still for Jerry, he
fondles her breasts, feeling up her entire body. As she moans into
the gag, Jerry comments on how soft she is. I slap her face several
times, enjoying the smacking sounds my hands make against her
pink skin. Forcing her to her knees, I rub my cock into her face-
over her cheeks and her eyes and her nose. She turns her head,
closing her eyes with the humiliation, so I shove my prick as far as it
will go into her ear. Her inner cannals [sic] warm; I force it in
127. This is an example of the sexually explicit nature inherent in the stories Alkhabaz posted
on the Internet. This story is graphic and contains material of obvious prurient interest.
Nonetheless, it ought to be noted that this is a mild story in comparison to the other stories
written by Alkhabaz. Additionally, the true name and actual address of Jane Doe has been
concealed to prevent her further fear, trauma, and humiliation. After this action took place, Jane
Doe was referred to psychological counseling due to her severe emotional and physical trauma.
See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1498 n.3.
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harder, and my penis-head scrunches up to fit in the small hole, not
quite making it. [First name omitted] groans into her gag.
Then Jerry and I tie her by her long brown hair to the ceiling fan,
so that she's dangling in mid-air. Her feet don't touch the ground.
She kicks trying to hit me, Jerry or the ground. The sight of her
wiggling in mid-air, hands rudely tied behind her back, turns me on.
Jerry takes a big spiky hair brush and start [sic] beating her small
breasts with it, coloring them with nice red marks. She screams and
struggles harder. I've separated her legs with a spreader-bar; now I
stretch out her pussy lips and super-glue them wide open. Then I
take a heavy clamp, and tighten it over her clit. Once its tight
enough, I let go.
I stand back, to take pictures. She's really nice now: Dangling by
her hair (I can see where its stretching her scalp), her breasts and
belly are covered with bright red bruises. There's a heavy clamp
stretching her cunt down. And best of all, her face is scrunched up
in agonized grimace. Drool and loud squeaks escape through her
gag. She's so beautiful like this. Just to add to the picture, I take a
steel-wired wisk and beat her ass with it, making bright red cuts that
drip blood.
Jerry tells me the curling-iron's ready. Jerry unplugs it and bring
[sic] it over. After taking her down and tying her hunched over a
chair, Jerry strokes the device against her bleeding ass cheeks. I
smile and stroke my cock as she screams in pain and horror. She
shakes her head and moans, "Nooo ... nooo" through the gag. I
walk in front of her, and remove the gag. Before she can even
breath in, I ram my cock in her tiny mouth. That's when Jerry ram
[sic] the hot curling iron into her tight asshole. She tries to scream,
but I shove my cock's [sic] down her throat and I start humping her
face furiously. The pain of the hot curling iron in her tender asshole
sent her whole body into convulsions; her throat clenched against
my cock. God! This felt so good.
Leaving the iron up her asshole, Jerry took his knife, and cut her
nipple off. She gags on my cock some more, and I pull out just in
time to cum all over her pretty face. As I spew loads of hot white
cum onto her face, Jerry continues to maul at her breasts. He pulls
them as far as they'll go away from her body, twisting them to cause
even more pain. Now that she doesn't have my cock down her
throat, she howls out loud. It's not even a human sound. Her eyes
glaze over from the pain and torture; a ball of my cum smacks her in
the left eye. Spent, I go grab a beer and watch Jerry finish off play.
When he pulls the curling-iron from her asshole, her sensitive skin is
all burned. He pressed the head of his cock against the tortured
opening. Jerry's got a savagely big dick, and would have hurt this
girl even if her ass hadn't been burned. [First name omitted] let out
a small scream, but was too weak at this point to make it really loud.
She only made fierce grunts as my friend's cock tore apart the inside
of her scorched asshole. Then he finally came inside her. Her eyes,
barely human begged him to stop. "C'mon, man, lets go!" My
friend said. So we got the gasoline and spread it all over her and
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her apartment. It must have burned like hell when it came into con-
tact with her cuts, but I couldn't tell. Her face was already a mask of
pain and her body quivered fiiercely [sic]. "Goodbye," I said, and
lit a match.128
B. United States v. Jake Baker: The Trial Court Decision
of Alkhabaz
On February 9, 1995, federal agents arrested Alkhabaz for allegedly
transmitting, through interstate or foreign commerce, communications
containing threats to kidnap or injure the person of another under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c). 1 2 9 Alkhabaz appeared before a United States Magis-
trate Judge on February 10, 1995, and was thereafter detained as a
danger to the community.130 The district court judge approved this
order and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 13 1
On February 14, 1995, Alkhabaz was charged in a one-count indict-
ment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).132 This indictment was based
upon the Jane Doe story Alkhabaz had posted on the Internet and
other "unspecified communications transmitted in interstate and for-
eign commerce . . . . ,,133 One month later, Alkhabaz and e-mail com-
panion Arthur Gonda 134 were charged in a superseding indictment
128. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497 n.1 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). See also Doe by lake Baker,
at http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/Porn/Baker/doe.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2001); EFF
"Legal Cases- Jake Baker, the U. of Michigan, & the FBI" Archive, at http://www.eff.org./pub/
Legal/Cases[BakerUmich_case/baker.story (last modified June 22, 1999); Jake Baker Stories, at
http://www.torture.net/content/literature/baker.htm (visited Jan. 19, 2000).
129. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493. The statute under which Alkhabaz was arrested read:
"Whoever transmits in interstate commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap
any person or any threat to injure the person of another shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1999). This Note will not examine
in great detail whether Alkhabaz's stories and e-mails constituted a true threat. However, for
detailed analysis of what constitutes a true threat under the First Amendment, see Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); United States v. Kelner 534 F.2d 1020 (2d. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976); Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1375.
130. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379. Alkhabaz was jailed for twenty-nine days until a psychiatric
evaluation, dated March 10, 1995, concluded that Alkhabaz presented no clear and present dan-
ger to the named student or to the community at large. Id. at 1379, 1379 n.5. To some people
Alkhabaz's detainment of twenty-nine days is disturbing because psychiatric evaluations dated
as early as January 20, 1995, February 7, 1995, and February 9, 1995, concluded that Alkhabaz
did not display any risk factors for potential violence. Id. at 1379 n.5.
131. United States v. Alkhabaz, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1995).
132. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380.
133. Id. The transmissions took place from December 2, 1994, through January 9, 1995. Id.
134. Id. at 1379. Arthur Gonda (Gonda) "sent and received e-mail through a computer in
Ontario, Canada. Gonda's identity and whereabouts are [still] unknown." Id. at 1379. See also
GODWIN, supra note 44, at 122 (reporting that it is still unclear whether Gonda is a real person or
a fictitious person invented to spoof Alkhabaz because Canadian officials asserted that no such
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with five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) because, in context, the
e-mail messages exchanged between Alkhabaz and Gonda constituted
threats. 135
Alkhabaz filed a motion to quash the superseding indictment. 136
The district court granted the motion and acknowledged the history
behind First Amendment jurisprudence and its denial of protection to
true threats. 137 However, the court failed to address the First Amend-
ment issues clearly evident in Alkhabaz's Internet transmissions. 138
The court altogether ignored Alkhabaz's contention that the "applica-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) to the e-mail transmissions push[ed] the
boundaries of the statute beyond the limits of the First Amend-
ment." 139 On April 15, 1995, Judge Avern Cohn granted Alkhabaz's
motion to quash and ruled that the e-mail transmissions between
Alkhabaz and Gonda did not constitute true threats, but were merely
shared fantasies, or private discussions of sexual desires, and thus pro-
tected under the First Amendment. 140 The government appealed. 141
C. United States v. Alkhabaz
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision, with Circuit Judge Robert B. Krupanksy
dissenting. 42 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin,
Jr., declined to use First Amendment analysis or principles and held
that the "electronic messages between [the] defendant and [Gonda]
expressing sexual interests in violence against women and girls, did
not constitute 'communications containing a threat."1 43 In further-
ance of its holding, the court agreed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's analysis on what constituted a true
threat, which concluded that a "literal interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) would lead to absurd results not intended by Congress."' 44
Thus, the court held that any intercontinental communication contain-
name was listed in Ontario tax records, but it was later discovered that there was someone
named Gonda in the region).
135. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
136. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
137. For an extensive review of case law on what constitutes a true threat, see supra note 129.
138. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
followed suit and declined "to address the First Amendment issues raised by the parties." Id.
139. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380.
140. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d. at 1493; Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381.
141. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1492.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1494 (citing United States v. Bellrichard, 779 F. Supp. 454, 459 (D. Minn. 1991)
affd, 994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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ing a threat to kidnap or injure another person is subject to criminal-
ization under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) only when the subject communicated
was conveyed with the general intent145 to effect a change or achieve a
goal with intimidation.146
In dissent, Judge Krupansky emphasized that the majority's deci-
sion was inconsistent with the congressional intent of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c), and "judicially legislat[ed] an exogenous element" into the
statute that materially altered its plain meaning. 147 As Krupansky un-
derstood 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), Congress intentionally refused to include
an element of intent when it drafted the section; "[t]he plain ex-
pressed statutory language commands only that the alleged communi-
cation.., contain any threat,... made for any reason or no reason.' 48
Thus, Judge Krupansky argued that the e-mails and stories transmit-
ted by Alkhabaz met the requirements of section 875(c) and were con-
sistent within the "scope of criminalized communications. ' 149 Judge
Krupansky focused on the five-count superseding indictment against
Alkhabaz and Gonda. Each of the counts characterized the communi-
cations as containing threats to injure or kidnap another person, thus
meeting the elements expressed in section 875(c).' 50 In part, the
counts charged the following:
Count One (Transmitting Threatening Communications - 18
U.S.C. § 875(c)) ... : [Alkhabaz] ... stat[ed] I highly agree with the
type of woman you like to hurt .... [I] want to do it to a really
young girl first. [!]3[sic] or 14. There [sic] innocence makes them so
145. Id. at 1495 (holding that a reasonable person "would take the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm"). "A 'general intent' to threaten exists where a
reasonable person would objectively take the defendant's statement to be a 'serious expression
of an intention to inflict bodily harm[,]' whereas a 'specific intent' to threaten exists only where
the speaker subjectively intended, in fact, to threaten a person." United States v. DeAndino, 958
F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992) (discussing the particular stan-
dard to be applied to general or specific intent). See also Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1503 (discussing
controlling precedents that reflect the principle of what constitutes a true threat).
146. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1495 (illustrating that although threats may offend our senses, a
communication objectively indicating a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm
cannot constitute a threat unless the communication is also conveyed for the purpose of further-
ing some goal through the use of intimidation). The court concluded that the communications
between Alkhabaz and Gonda were mere messages through which they "attempted to foster a
friendship based on shared sexual fantasies." Id. at 1496. Furthermore, the court held that "no
reasonable person would perceive the communications as having the intention to change or
reach a goal through intimidation." Id.
147. Id. at 1496-1497.
148. Id. at 1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[t]he words in § 875(c) are sim-
ple, clear, concise, and unambiguous"). See also DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 148-49 (presuming "that
the language of § 875(c) does not expressly require a heightened mental element in regard to the
communication containing a threat"').
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1499-1501.
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much more fun-and they'll be easier to control .... [Gonda re-
sponded]:... I would love to do a 13 or 14 year old. I think you are
right . . . not only their innocence but their young bodies would
really be fun to hurt. As far as being easier to control ... you can
control any bitch with rope and gag .... [to which Alkhabaz re-
sponded] ... [Y]oung girls turn me on more. Likely to be nice and
tight. Oh they'd scream nicely too! ... ts
Count Two and Three [same] (Transmitting Threatening Commu-
nications - 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c)): ... [Alkhabaz] stated: ... I've been
trying to think of secluded spots ... I don't want any blood in my
room, though I have come up with an excellent method to abduct a
bitch .... [Gonda replied: A dorm would be too populated for an
abduction. The police, would surely come around asking
questions].1 52
Count Four (Transmitting Threatening Communications - 18
U.S.C. § 875 (c)):... Gonda stated: ... I have been out tonight and
I can tell you that I am thinking more and more about doing' [sic] a
girl ... I can think of no better use for their flesh. I HAVE to make
a bitch suffer. [To which Alkhabaz responded]: Are [sic] tastes are
so similar. it scares me:-) When I lay down at night. All I think of
before sleep is how I'd torture a bitch I get my hands on .... 153
Count Five (Transmitting Threatening Communications - 18
U.S.C. § 875(c)): [Gonda stated]: . . . I had a great orgasm today
thinking of how you and I would torture this very petite and cute,
south american girl in one of my classes .... [Alkhabaz responded]:
Just thinking about it anymore doesn't do the trick ... I need TO
DO IT .... 5 4
Judge Krupansky found that all five counts violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) because Alkhabaz and Gonda knowingly transmitted in inter-
state and foreign commerce, via e-mail messages and Internet stories,
a threat to injure another person. 55 Judge Krupansky rejected the
majority's interpretation that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) required actionable
threats against a specific person, and stated that a threat could in fact
be made against an identifiable category of individuals. 56 Judge
Krupansky further argued that Alkhabaz's threats of harm were
against women, not necessarily any particular woman.' 57
151. Afkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1499.
152. Id. at 1500 n.5.
153. Id. at 1500.
154. Id. at 1501.
155. See id. (quoting section 875(c)).
156. Id. at 1504 n.10.
157. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1504 n.10. Nonetheless, one may argue that the e-mail threats
were made against particular women and young girls. The language in Alkhabaz's and Gonda's
e-mail transmissions made reference to a specific neighbor of Alkhabaz and targeted thirteen
and fourteen-year-old girls who resided near Alkhabaz, multiple teenage girls who lived near
Alkhabaz when he resided in Ohio, female students who resided in Alkhabaz's dormitory, and
female classmates. Id.
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In addition, Krupansky based his dissent on more than the statutory
interpretations of section 875(c), and realized that Alkhabaz's articles
were lurid e-mail discussions of co-conspirators.1 58 Krupansky's in-
ability to agree with the majority was based on his recognition that
Alkhabaz's stories and e-mail messages were "misogynistic articles
evinc[ing] an extreme and morbid fascination with the.., physical and
psychological abuse and [torture] of women and young girls . ...",59
Therefore, Krupansky stated that not only did the threatening speech,
easily detected in Alkhabaz's e-mails and Internet stories, violate 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), but it also traveled beyond the boundaries of consti-
tutional immunization. 160
IV. ANALYZING THE OBSCENITY AND THREATS WITHIN
ALKHABAZ'S SPEECH
The large amount of societal concern surrounding the Alkhabaz
case and the Sixth Circuit's prevailing concern for the right of men to
foster relationships through the sharing of sexual fantasies' 61 has
struck a cord of disappointment among many women. The reverbera-
tion from this disappointment has manifested itself into a proposal
which suggests a dismissal of the theory that the truth will prevail in a
marketplace of ideas, and the need for enacting a federal statute that
will regulate obscenity on the Internet. Internet users have abused
the newfound privileges of Internet communication and have taken
for granted their ability to perform and communicate without being
subject to strict regulation. Unless Congress takes action, the continu-
ation of trafficking obscenity on the Internet, in any form, will perpet-
uate the continued subordination of women.
The Internet and the communication that it nurtures must be regu-
lated and strictly limited when it interferes with the fundamental
rights of other individuals and the community as a whole. 162 Further-
more, the right to free speech must be understood in relation to the
nation's developing conception of fundamental rights and the place
158. Id. at 1507.
159. Id. at 1497.
160. Id. 1506-507.
161. Id. at 1496 (viewing Alkhabaz and Gonda as merely "attempt[ing] to foster a relationship
based on shared sexual fantasies").
162. Steven Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (1998). "[Tlhis principle was widely held
when [the] Amendments to [the United States Constitution] were adopted, [yet] no longer holds
a central place in American constitutional theory or doctrine." Id. at 1299.
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they hold in the social order of America.163 As early as 1803, William
Blackstone noted that "the principle aim of society is to protect indi-
viduals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in
them by the immutable laws of nature-the right to life, personal se-
curity, personal liberty, and private property. ' 164 Thus, the freedom
of speech must be federally regulated for the common good and the
preservation of peace and social order. The Sixth Circuit, by permit-
ting Alkhabaz's speech on the Internet, has risked the preservation of
peace between America's men and women. In addition, the ruling has
underestimated women and their power to unsettle the current socie-
tal order and fight for their right to personal security and against their
continued subordination.
In analyzing the court's decision in Alkhabaz, two primary issues
must be addressed. The first question is whether the speech in
Alkhabaz's e-mails and BBS stories are considered obscene under the
First Amendment. 165 The second question is whether the court erred
in finding that Alkhabaz's speech did not contain true threats in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
A. Applying the Miller Test to Alkhabaz's Speech: Is the Jane Doe
Story Obscene?
Alkhabaz and his companion, Gonda, took the Internet for granted
when they made use of the Internet's broad capabilities to e-mail each
other and post stories on BBSs which discussed the rape, torture, mu-
tilation, and murder of young girls and women. The question be-
comes whether this type of speech, that dehumanizes women and
subordinates them to men, constitutes obscene speech under the First
Amendment. This question can be answered through the application
163. Id. at 1279. The government was established to protect rights, thus, the government has
an obligation to its people to respect the liberty of free speech and ensure that this liberty is not
used to violate the fundamental rights of others. Id. "It is important to note that those people
who support or oppose the regulation of speech often vary from one issue to the next." Id. at
1279 n.22. For example, some conservatives may support the prohibition of flag burning, while
some liberals may oppose this practice. Id. The positions on issues of speech regulation are
largely reversed on the regulation of cigarette advertising and anti-abortion demonstrations. Id.
164. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,* 151 (1803); see
also, Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality (pts. 1 & 2) 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1915)
(maintaining that even though a legal system is concerned with social interests or community
interests, the social interest in security is the first interest given attention from the law). For an
in depth review of Dean Pound's theory in regard to sociological jurisprudence and freedom of
speech, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBiGuous LEGACY OF
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM, 69-74 (1991); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social
Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951, 988-1001 (1996); Heyman, supra note 162, at 1299-1304.
165. The Sixth Circuit avoided addressing First Amendment issues inherent in Alkhabaz's
speech. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1501.
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of recent case history, and the current obscenity standard of review
brought forth in Miller v. California.166 The three basic guidelines of
the Miller test are clearly satisfied in the present case.
First, under a majority of state statutes defining obscenity, the aver-
age person applying any contemporary community standard would
find that Alkhabaz's speech, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient in-
terests. 67 For example, Alkhabaz's Jane Doe Story and multiple e-
mail messages appealed to the average person's prurient interests be-
cause of their morbid, sadistic, and unconstrained demonstrations of
subordinating women to men through rape, torture, and murder.168
Secondly, Alkhabaz's speech depicted or described, in a patently of-
fensive way, the type of sexual conduct that has been specifically de-
fined by applicable state statutes as being obscene. 169 Juries in most
states have found that the depiction of women and young girls being
raped, kidnapped, and tortured is obscene. t70 Furthermore, the Jane
Doe Story went beyond the realm of simulated rape and entered the
territory of sodomy, sexual bestiality, sadism, masochism, excretion,
and lewd exhibition of the victim's genitals. Alkhabaz's speech por-
trayed the savaged torture and brutal beatings of women gagged and
bound with no possibility of rescue, and men without any possibility of
punishment.
Third, the Jane Doe Story and e-mails, taken as a whole, lacked
serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value. 17' The argu-
ment that Alkhabaz's stories constitute creative fictional pieces of
literature cannot be denied because they forcefully illustrate the crea-
tive ability to murder women and become aroused at the same time.172
However, writers of fiction are not immune from liability when they
infringe on the fundamental rights of others. 173 Further, obscenity,
whether or not classified as fiction, has never been granted First
166. See supra notes 105-117 and accompanying text.
167. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (listing the first guideline as whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest"). For examples of state statutes and their definitions of obscenity, see 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-20 (West 1999); L. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (West 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 235.00 (McKinney 1999); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (West 1999).
168. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497-1498 n.1.
169. Id.
170. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (listing the second guideline as "whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law"). For examples of state statutes defining sexual conduct, see supra note 167.
171. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (listing the third guideline as "whether the work taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
172. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497 n.1. The Jane Doe Story strongly illustrates this point.
173. Heyman, supra note 162, at 1391.
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Amendment protection. 74 Thus, the cloak of the First Amendment
should have been denied to Alkhabaz and the Jane Doe story. 175
B. Applying 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) to Alkhabaz's Speech: Is the Jane
Doe Story a True Threat to Women? a76
Under the plain language of the statute, in order for Alkhabaz to be
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 177 the government need only
prove that the Internet stories and e-mails constituted transmissions in
interstate commerce, and that the communications contained a threat
to injure or kidnap a person.a78 The Sixth Circuit erred when it relied
on inconsistent court precedent concerning section 875(c) and con-
cluded that speech describing the plan to savagely torture and rape
women and young girls does not contain the elements of a true
threat.179 However, the distinctions between the different definitions
of true threats used by the circuit courts are confusing and often result
in courts using an insufficiently loose or too strict definition for the
purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence. 80 The situation is fur-
ther complicated by the differing precedents that affect a court's abil-
ity to know which precedent to follow. Typically, a court will follow
the prevailing jurisdictional precedent or case law that interprets the
statute in a manner similar to this court. These complications are evi-
dent in Alkhabaz's trial and appellate court decisions.' 81
In Baker, the district court relied on the constitutional dimensions
of a true threat as expanded upon by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Kelner. 82 Kelner's
174. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (holding that obscenity is not protected under the First
Amendment).
175. Rice, 128 F.3d at 262.
176. This Note will not examine in detail the inconsistencies with which the Alkhabaz and
Baker courts interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Nonetheless, this Note will lay the necessary
foundation upon which to build the argument. For a detailed Note on the inconsistencies
between the courts, see David C. Potter, Note, The Jake Baker Case: True Threats and New
Technology, 79 B.U. L. REv. 779 (1999).
177. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178. United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206
(1992) (listing the "three elements of the offense defined by t8 U.S.C.§ 875(c)").
179. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1492 ("Electronic mail messages between defendant and another,
expressing sexual interest in violence against women and girls, did not constitute 'communica-
tions containing a threat.'").
180. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381 (Cohn, J.) (realizing that deciding whether a statement is a
"true threat" for the purpose of First Amendment limitation is confusing).
181. Compare Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381, 1383-85 (noting the confusion among the Circuit
Courts of Appeals regarding the different understandings of the phrase "true threat"), with
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1495 (interpreting a true threat under DeAndino as distinguishable from
Kelner).
182. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
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standard of review for the prosecution of a crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) is constitutionally required, and consistent with the statute's
legislative history.183 Under Kelner, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is properly ap-
plied to speech when the alleged threat is "unequivocal, uncondi-
tional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.' 18 4
It is not necessary that the statement or threat be communicated di-
rectly to the would-be-target, rather the statement must be evaluated
in light of foreseeable recipients of the communication.185
The defendant in Kelner, a member of the Jewish Defense League,
was convicted for his threatening statements on a New York television
news program proclaiming that the Jewish Defense League planned to
assassinate Yasser Arafat, who was in New York City at the time.86
Kelner claimed that his purpose in issuing the threat was to further
political objectives of his organization through intimidation. 18 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld Kel-
ner's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C § 875(c) and determined that
his statements "unambiguously constituted an immediate threat upon
the life or safety of Arafat and his aides."1 88 The Second Circuit held
that Kelner's language was unequivocal, unconditional, immediate,
and specific as to a target and thus satisfied these criteria. 189 There-
fore, the court held that the "threat was within the constitutionally
permissible scope of the statute" and thus, deemed in violation of sec-
tion 875(c).190
The facts of Baker are similar to Kelner, in that both men
threatened a specific person as well as a particular group of people in
general, through the use of the media. Nonetheless, the Baker court
erred when it held that the government can only exercise its authority
183. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1383.
184. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027. However, Judge Mulligan stated that "the proposed require-
ment that the threat be of immediate, imminent and unconditional injury seems to be required
neither by [18 U.S.C. § 875(c)] nor the First Amendment." Id. at 1029 (Mulligan, J., concurring).
185. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382, 1386 ("[W]hile the statement need not identify a specific
individual as its target, it must ... as to its potential target or targets to render the statement
more than hypothetical.").
186. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021.
187. Id. at 1021-22. Kelner testified that his statements at the Jewish Defense League's press
conference were not actual statements describing the plan to assassinate Yasser Arafat, but
rather responses to threats from the Palestine Liberation Organization. Id. The sole objective
behind making the statements "was to show the PLO that 'we [as Jews] would defend ourselves
and . . . [that the PLO] would not be able to accomplish anything in accordance with their
threats."' Id. at 1022.
188. Id. at 1028.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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when the communication at issue is so interlocked with the violent act
that it actually constitutes a part of the proscribed action itself.191
Based on the Kelner method of inquiry, the issue of whether Alkhabaz
intended to carry out the actions he described on the Internet should
be irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.192  Furthermore,
Alkhabaz's threats need not identify a specific person but merely a
potential target. 193 The court subsequently erred, after analyzing the
counts against Alkhabaz and Gonda, by holding that Alkhabaz's
speech "constituting shared fantasies" fell short of being true threats
under Kelner because they were not "unequivocal, unconditional, im-
mediate or specific threat[s that] convey[ed] an imminent prospect of
execution," and the potential target was too indeterminate. 194
The confusion surrounding section 875(c) is demonstrated by the
Alkhabaz court's interpretation of the statute. The Alkhabaz court
did not follow the Kelner standard of review, but rather precedent set
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. DeAndino.1 95 The court in DeAndino, defined a true threat
under section 875(c) as
communication such that a reasonable person: (1) would take the
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily
harm (the mens rea), and (2) would perceive such expression as be-
ing communicated to effect some change or achieve some goal
through intimidation (the actus reus). 196
The Alkhabaz court referred to the precedent set forth in De-
Andino,197 and the requirement that a mens rea accompany the actus
191. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382 (citing Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 329 (1970)))(recognizing that the "only extended discus-
sion of the constitutional dimension of the 'true threat' requirement with regard to § 875(c) is
found in United States v. Kelner").
192. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1385.
193. id. at 1386.
194. Id. at 1385-86; Potter, supra note 176, at 795.
195. United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206
(1992).
196. Alkhabaz, 104 F. Supp. at 1495; Potter, supra note 176, at 795 ("restating the DeAndino
standard, which articulates the actus reus elements").
197. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496; DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146. The DeAndino court identified
three elements of an actus reus for a defense defined under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c): "There must be:
(1) a transmission in interstate commerce; (2) a communication containing a threat; and (3) the
threat must be a threat to injure the person of another." Id. at 149. Additionally, the court held
that the mens rea requirement of section 875(c) calls only for general intent since, "according to
the plain language of the statute," the section does not expressly discuss an element of specific
intent. Id. at 149-50. Thus, the standard of review is objective, regarding, only that a reasonable
person consider the communication a threat, regardless of the defendants' subjective belief and
intent. Id. at 148. See also Potter, supra note 176, at 783-93.
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reus, as specifically set forth by statute.198 Thus, if the threatening
speech from an objective standpoint is transmitted for the purpose of
intimidation and it is likely that the recipient will be intimidated or the
recipient's peace of mind will be disrupted, then the speech will con-
stitute a true threat under section 875(c).199
In DeAndino, the defendant was charged under section 875(c) for
"knowingly and willfully transmitting in interstate commerce a com-
munication containing a threat to injure" another person.2°° The
court examined whether speech deemed communication containing a
threat required general or specific intent,20 1 and determined that gen-
eral intent was the presumptive required element under section
875(c). 202
Thus, applying DeAndino, the court held that Alkhabaz's speech
did not constitute "communications containing a threat" under section
875(C). 20 3 The court held that "no reasonable person would perceive
... [Alkhabaz's] communications as being conveyed to effect some
change or achieve some goal through intimidation. ' 20 4 Under De-
Andino's interpretation of section 875(c), the Alkhabaz court erred in
granting First Amendment protection to Alkhabaz's e-mails and In-
ternet stories. The court further erred in its failure to perceive
Alkhabaz's e-mails and stories as threats written to effect some socie-
tal change or achieve some societal goal through intimidation. 20 5
The Alkhabaz court's interpretation of section 875(c) is inconsistent
with both the statutory language and precedent. The Alkhabaz court
erred in several ways with regard to the holding in DeAndino. First,
the court misinterpreted the DeAndino standard of review. The De-
Andino court interpreted section 875(c) as requiring only general in-
tent, and accordingly held that the statute only required proof that a
reasonable person would have taken the defendant's statement as a
198. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
199. Id.
200. DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 147. Defendant, Jean Pierre DeAndino, threatened Nelson Baker
by stating that he was "going to blow his brains out." Id.
201. Id. at 148 (holding that if the statute required general intent, the standard would objec-
tively inquire whether a "reasonable person consider[ed] the statement to be a threat"). If the
statute required specific intent, the standard would subjectively question whether the defendant
had "subjective knowledge that his statement constituted a threat to injure" and whether he
"subjectively intend[ed] the statement to be a threat." Id.
202. Id.
203. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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"serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm. ' 20 6 Had the
Alkhabaz court correctly applied DeAndino, it is likely that the court
would have held that a member of the general public or a reasonable
woman would have perceived Alkhabaz's statements as expressions of
the intention to inflict bodily harm to another person.
In addition, the court erred in failing to decide the issue of whether
Alkhabaz's speech contained an intent to inflict bodily harm or effect
some change, rather than leaving the question to the trier of fact. It is
likely that a trier of fact would have found that the speech portrayed
intentions to inflict bodily harm. "There can be no doubt that a ra-
tional jury [would have found] that some or all of the communications
[between Alkhabaz and Gonda] ... constituted threats ... to harm a
female human being, which a reasonable objective recipient of the
transmissions would find credible. '20 7 The Jane Doe Story was a pre-
meditated plan to rape, torture, and murder a female classmate, as
well as women and young girls in general. 208
The correct interpretation of section 875(c) is found within Judge
Krupansky's dissenting opinion: "[E]very communication conveying
an intention to kidnap or injure any person sent in interstate or for-
eign commerce which would appear to an objective, rational recipient
to be a statement of a serious intent to commit the harms menaced is
constitutionally prosecutable. 2 0 9 Therefore, a simple and yet credible
threat to cause injury to another, made for any reason or no reason at
all, constitutes a threat.210 Thus, the scope of section 875(c) is not
confined to criminalized communications directed to identified indi-
viduals with the intent to effect some particular change or goal. 211
Under Krupansky's definition and interpretation of section 875(c), it
is clear that the Alkhabaz majority erred in not characterizing the
communications as true threats in violation of the First Amendment.
It is likely that such an error was based upon the court's desire to
settle the issue when the decision should have been placed in the
hands of jurors.
206. DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 148 (citing United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir.
1982)).
207. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1504 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
208. The Jane Doe Story specifically contained one woman's name and her address. Id.
209. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d. at 1505 n.14.
210. Id. at 1502.
211. Id. at 1502 (Krupansky, J., dissenting); DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 148.
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C. Societal Factors Influencing the Baker and Alkhabaz
Courts Decisions
The striking aspect of the court's failure to find a true threat in
Alkhabaz's e-mail and Internet stories demonstrates the utter failure
of the court to consider the negative impact that obscene e-mails and
Internet stories have upon women. The unpunished existence of such
threatening messages allows the continuing subordination of women
in society. "Women cannot live in a true society with men until [they]
have equal standing" within the community. 212 Such standing requires
the denial of First Amendment protection to obscene Internet trans-
missions that portray women as sexual objects.
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr.'s majority opinion in Alkhabaz
proved that in reality the court did not acknowledge the role that true
threats, such as Alkhabaz's messages, play in the continuation of
women's social and sexual subordination. Ironically, in Baker, Judge
Avern Cohn stated the following:
It is not the policy of the law to punish those unsuccessful threats
which it is not presumed would terrify ordinary persons excessively;
and there is so much opportunity for magnifying or misunderstand-
ing undefined menaces that probably as much mischief would be
caused by letting them be prosecuted as by refraining from it.21 3
Both courts misunderstood the menaces contained within Alkhabaz's
speech because it is reasonable to believe that such speech would ter-
rify an average woman. The court should have acknowledged and
taken into consideration a woman's thoughts as to whether the stories
and e-mails were threatening.214 The court may have had a difficult
212. Stella Rozanski, Obscenity: Common Law and the Abuse of Women, 13 ADEL. L. REV.
163, 173 (1991).
213. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1378 (citing People v. B. F. Jones, 28 N.W. 839 (Mich. 1886)).
214. The Alkhabaz court did not take into consideration what women thought about the Jane
Doe Story or whether the actual woman portrayed in the story felt the story threatened her
safety. Unfortunately, the disregard of women's issues apparently is a common practice in to-
day's courtrooms.
As Congress learned from numerous witnesses and studies commissioned by the state
judiciaries themselves, state regulation of forms of assault traditionally directed at
women has been deeply shaped by stereotypical thinking about women. From the po-
lice report through prosecution, trial and sentencing, state actors take crimes against
women less seriously than other crimes.
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Violence Against Women's
Act. Draft (on file with author). Furthermore,
[s]tudy after study commissioned by the highest courts of the states ... has concluded
that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriously than
comparable crimes affecting men. Collectively these reports provide overwhelming ev-
idence that gender bias permeates the court system and that women are most of its
victims.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43-44 (1991)).
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time deciding whether the stories were threatening due to the inher-
ent biases evident in a court which is composed primarily of male
judges. 215 These biases "do not mean that judges hate women or even
believe unconsciously that men are innately superior human beings to
women," but rather, "judges look at the world from a perspective held
by men more than women" and this results in producing laws "better
adapted to the needs of men than those of women. '2 16
Many women in our society will read the Jane Doe Story, recognize
the true threats it contains, and begin to feel fear. For example, in a
recent case study of Alkhabaz in an Internet Law class at the Seattle
University School of Law, women who read the Alkhabaz case had
different reactions as to whether the stories constituted threats when
they were confronted with the stories in the setting of a secure class-
room, as opposed to their feelings outside the classroom.217 In this
class, the professor questioned "whether the utopian view of the In-
ternet as a decentralized communication medium with revolutionary
democratic potential," otherwise known as cyberspace, is challenged
by the electronic transmission of stories involving the rape, torture,
and mutilation of women. 218 In class, one female student reported
that she did not believe that the government should have brought the
case against Alkhabaz. 219 However, that student soon changed her
mind when she was confronted by an unknown male outside of the
classroom, who utilized the Internet in obtaining contact with her.2 20
Although the woman may have initially believed that the Alkhabaz
decision was legitimate, her position changed when she herself was
215. "Despite the steady increase in the numbers of women lawyers and judges, the federal
and state judiciaries are still overwhelmingly male and white." U.S. Report to the U.N. on Sta-
tus of Women, § 2, Gender Bias in the Courts, August 1994, available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
ERC/intlorg/Status of Women/s2.html. According to the United States Report to the United
Nations on the status of women and the judicial system from 1985 to 1994:
There are 837 seats on the federal judiciary - nine on the Supreme Court, 179 on the
Circuit Courts and 649 on District Courts. As of January 1, 1994, there was a total of
101 female federal judges - two Supreme Court, 24 circuit, and 75 district judges.
These figures include eight African-American women and six Hispanic-American
women. During 1993, his first year in office, President Clinton sent to Congress his
confirmation 48 judicial nominees - a group unprecedented for its diversity: 18 women,
II African-Americans, 3 Hispanic-Americans.
Id. Furthermore, regardless of the increased number of women in American courtrooms, there
is still a continual bias against "women litigants, witnesses, lawyers, jurors, court employees and
judges" as demonstrated in a 1994 study conducted by twenty-one states and two federal circuits
which found that bias was a significant problem in the courts. Id.
216. Becker, supra note 72, at 988.
217. Chon, supra note 46, at 144.
218. Id. The professor focused on the Jane Doe Story. Id.
219. Id.
22(0. Id.
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confronted with the Internet's capability to aid in the commission of
crimes by sexual predators.22'
Women experience and fear many things because of their gender.222
For example, "women fear rape not because of anything in [their] in-
dividual personalities, but because [they] are women in a rapist soci-
ety. And every time a woman is sexually harassed or confronted with
some other manifestation of sexism, [such as sexual obscenity or vio-
lence on the Internet] it is only because she is a woman." 223 Very
often, a woman's individuality is seen as totally irrelevant or is simply
disregarded; thus, threats to women's status in society through the In-
ternet are accepted by some members of society because of the tradi-
tional belief that women are inferior to men. 22 4 Consequently, when a
woman views sexual violence, threats, or obscenity on the Internet
and in society, she must realize that everything which is done to
women could be done to her, due to the simple fact that she is a
woman.
225
221. In particular, the female student was confronted with a tow-truck driver who had re-
sponded to her call to the Automobile Association of America (AAA). Chon, supra note 46, at
144-45. The tow-truck driver asked her to get into the car in order to go to the home office. Id.
The girl recognized that the request was out of the ordinary and denied the man's request. Id.
Soon after, the tow-truck driver sent by AAA arrived. Id. Apparently, the first tow-truck driver
had been monitoring the webpage of the AAA and preyed on women whose cars broke down.
Id. At least two rapes were allegedly attributed to this tow-truck driver. Id.
222. Rozanski, supra note 212, at 165. "Women experience so many things in a certain way
because we are women. Very often our individuality is totally irrelevant or disregarded because
we are women." Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. See also Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Pornography and Sexual Abuses of
Women, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 314, 314-15 (Mary Becker et
al eds., 1994) (demonstrating how a woman portrayed in obscene or pornographic material is
used to depict all women in the eyes of some men). Accordingly, when a man reads or writes
about or looks at obscene or pornographic material and then sees a woman not associated with
that material, the non-associated woman "becomes" the woman in the obscene material. Id. at
314. This theory is identified in a study of 200 prostitutes and the relationship between sexual
abuse and their assailants' referral to obscene or pornographic materials during the sexual or
physical abuse. Id. Out of 193 cases of rape, 24% mentioned the assailants referral to obscene
or pornographic material. Id. For example, one assailant began punching and raping the woman
and told her he had seen whores like her in three pornographic movies mentioned by name. Id.
at 316. The assailant stated, "You were in that movie. You were in that movie. You know you
wanted to die after you were raped. That's what you want; you want me to kill you just like
(specific pornographic film) did." Id.
This particular woman suffered, in addition to forced vaginal penetration, forced anal
penetration with a gun, excessive bodily injuries, including several broken bones; and a
period of the time in which the rapist held a loaded pistol at her vagina, threatening to
shoot, insisting this was the way she had died in the film that he had seen.
Id. at 316.
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The court also failed by characterizing the communication in the
Jane Doe Story as mere fantasies shared between friends.22 6 The
judge completely ignored the real dialog that is held between men
who share their fantasies and the impact such stories have on women
and society. The court ignored any social considerations as a basis for
prohibiting speech containing threats to women. Male sexual fanta-
sies about the mutilation and subordination of women should not be
considered harmless when they are coupled with the power men pos-
sess in today's society. This power is visible through the present patri-
archal society where men have the ability to determine women's roles
in society. This power is evident in the continued attempts to
subordinate women, and the subsequent fueling of anti-feminist polit-
ics.2 27 Male fantasies are implicit abstracts manifested from their per-
ceptions of reality; thus, the abstracts themselves facilitate the
subordination of women.
The way in which men control the status of women in society is
inferable in the context of abuse. Theoretically, men physically abuse
women because "the violence temporarily stops a woman from doing
what threatens and challenges [men's] authority. '22 8 Men can gener-
ally overpower women in physical strength; additionally, "men have
226. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
227. VICTOR J SEIDLER, UNREASONABLE MEN: MASCULINITY AND SOCIAL THEORY 98
(1994). Men have learned that masculinity is power and that if a man wanted to aid in the fight
against the subordination of women he would have to give up his masculinity. Id. "In some
cases this has possibly fueled a kind of anti-feminist politics, a threat or fear that women are
somehow out to take away men's potency . I..." d. Thus, men cannot reject their masculinity
even if it is the fuel lighting the fire that is burning women into subordination. Id. at 101. Catha-
rine MacKinnon also noted that men embrace their masculinity and the advantages it gives
them. The primary advantage or inherent value of male masculinity is "the mechanism by which
their interest itself is enforced and perpetuated and sustained: power. Power in its socially male
form. It is not only that men treat women badly, although often they do, but that it is their
choice whether or not to do so." CATHARINE MACKINNON, Consciousness Raising, in FEMINIST
JURISI'RUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 52, 54 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 1994). For a more
philosophical analysis of men's power in society, see ANNA G. JONASDOTrIIR, Her for Him, Him
for the State: The Significance of Sex and Marriage in Hobbes's and Locke's Political Theories, in
WHY WOMEN ARE OPPRESSED 109-43 (1994) (exploring the writings of Thomas Hobbes and
John Locke, "the influential forefathers of liberalism" and their views on the relations between
the sexes, the usefulness of the female sex, and the historical process of an emerging patriarchal
institution). During the life of Thomas Hobbes, in 1662, Margaret Lucas, Duchess of Newcastle
characterized the relationship between the sexes:
Men are so unconscionable and cruel against us, as they endeavor to Barr us all Sorts or
kinds of Liberty, as not to suffer us Freely to associate amongst our own sex, but, would
fain Bury us in their houses or Beds, as in a Grave; the truth is, we live like Bats or
owls, Labour like Beasts, and Dye like worms.
MARGARET LUCAS, DUCHESS OF NEWCASTLE, Female Orations, in WHY WOMEN ARE OP-
PRESSED 109 (Anna G. Jonasdottir 1994).
228. Dick Bathrick & Gus Kaufman, Jr., Male Privilege and Male Violence: Patriarchy's Root
and Branch, in MEN & INTIMACY 111, 112 (Franklin Abbot ed., 1990).
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been socialized to believe [they] have the right and privilege to domi-
nate and control women" via their physical strength or mental
power.229 It has been noted that no sense of a woman's own self-
purpose can supersede male domination until the male's sense of her
purpose enables him to experience "raw phallic power. '230 Reading
or communicating obscene speech on the Internet allows men to fully
realize their sense of power, that women are mere objects, and that
women have the sole purpose of making men erect. Allowing obscen-
ity on the Internet leads to men subordinating women, forces women
to believe that their true purpose and nature is to be used by men and
that she is merely an object to be controlled.231
When discussing the system of male domination and female subor-
dination, the workings of a patriarchy, a system of male control over
women, is being described.232 Studies show that male subordinators
229. Id. For example, many women make most of their decisions based on how to avoid
subjecting themselves to dominating men; decisions such as where and when to walk at night,
whom to talk with and what to wear, demonstrate how much control men have over women and
the way they think. Id. at 114. "So men end up determining if women get to go out and where
they go." Id. Women desire to go through a day without being systematically subordinated to
men thus women "spend an incredible amount of time, life, and energy cowed, fearful, and
colonized, trying to figure out how not to be the next [woman] on the list." CATHARINE MAC-
KINNON, Introduction: The Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1, 7 (1987). It is
only through "osmosis [that women will learn] what men want in a woman and try[] to give it to
them" and the hope that if the woman becomes the desired image men will release the subordi-
nating power over them. Id. Women act in accordance for their safety, nonetheless, the way
that some women act reinforces the belief that men are the only route to safety, when in fact
men are the danger. For example, some women will agree that they sometimes depend on men
to protect them, to walk them home late at night, so that in the end, men end up determining if
women will go out and where they go, thus once again exercising control. Bathrick & Kaufman,
supra note 228, at 114.
230. PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 68, at 128. See also Dworkin, Pornography Happens to
Women, in THE PRICE WE PAY 181, 182 n.1 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995)
(describing a man's ability to experience "raw phallic power" is in a sense describing a man's
ability to cause and sustain a penile erection).
231. Id. at 182 n.51. See also Becker, supra note 72, at 992. Becker comments on "the extent
that injuries to women are someone else's constitutional right" and that women are less likely to
see the ways in which men injure them. Id. Becker furthers this analysis by quoting Robin West:
"The tendency of all subordinated persons toward self-belittlement by trivializing the nature of
their injuries is geometrically enhanced by the self-perception that their injuries do not exist
because their infliction is constitutionally protected." Id. at 992 (citing Robin West, Constitu-
tional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 765 (1992)).
232. Bathrick & Kaufman, supra note 228, at 114. Bathrick and Kaufman note that:
In our Western version of patriarchy, traditionally this meant a white, male god at the
top, the Pope, secular leaders like the President ... followed by middle management,
professionals, and religious leaders, then workers ... then white families (women, chil-
dren, and maiden aunts) and, at the bottom, people of color.
Id. See also JONASDOTFIR, Sex/Gender, Power, and Politics: Patriarchy in the Formally Equal
Society, in WHY WOMEN ARE OPPRESSED, supra note 227, at 11 (studying theoretical contempo-
rary power relations between the sexes). Jonasdottir used the term patriarchy and male domina-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
can decrease the amount of power they exercise over women by: (1)
listening to women without interrupting-giving women your full at-
tention and seriously considering their point of view; (2) believing
women and taking them seriously-accepting their feelings, versions,
and visions; (3) changing what is wrong-giving up pornography and
obscenity since they only reinforce the assumption that women are to
be controlled and subordinated. 233
To separate acts from fantasies, thoughts, or ideas, is artificial, but
this is exactly what the court did in Alkhabaz. The judicial system was
careful not to infringe upon social liberty; nonetheless, members of
the court and society must realize that once a person communicates
his or her fantasies, it becomes speech. Speech has real characteris-
tics, it is tangible, and it is no longer a figment of someone's dirty
imagination.2 34 The idea that obscene speech on the Internet is not
currently federally regulated is dangerous because in balancing
women's physical integrity with the ability of men to speak about their
obscene sexual fantasies over the Internet, the ability for men to dis-
cuss the subordination of women as mere sexual objects will ulti-
mately prevail in the courtroom. 235 Under Alkhabaz, mere fantasies
involving the rape and torture of women are granted First Amend-
ment protection.
As demonstrated in Alkhabaz, the law is profoundly patriarchal. 236
Lawyers themselves "are taught to think of issues, but not of the con-
tion synonymously in designating a social and political power system. Id. Jonasdottir made the
assumption "that sex/gender - women and men as sociosexual beings - comprises a particular
material base for generating and shaping history and society." Id. at 11-12.
233. Bathrick & Kaufman, supra note 228, at 115. Sociolinguists have also researched the
differences between men's and women's speech patterns. The data demonstrates that men's
speech "chills" women's speech and reveals that obscenity is a mechanism by which the chilling
occurs. Michelle J. Anderson, Silencing Women's Speech, in THE PRICE WE PAY 122, 124
("[R]esearch shows that after viewing pornography [and obscenity] women have less to say and
men hear less of what women do say.").
234. Fantasies are defined as "the art of forming images or representations whether in direct
perception or memory; also an image or impression derived through sensation." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 823 (1981).
235. It could be argued that the sexually degrading fantasies of men would not prevail in the
courtroom if the percentage of female judges were to increase or if the American Bar Associa-
tion Model Code of Judicial Conduct mandated and enforced a requirement that judges not
manifest bias or prejudice in the performance of their judicial duties. See Becker supra note 72,
at 987 (commenting that "judges are members of a small elite professional class and are over-
whelmingly white men"). For more information regarding judicial biases against women, see
Judith Resnik, Naturally Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1682 (1991); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988).
236. See Rozanski supra note 212, at 176.
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texts in which the issue arises. ' 237 The way in which lawyers think of
issues is determined by the law.2 38 Therefore, when considering an
offense, lawyers think of the elements which comprise the offense and
whether these elements are established.239 The validity of the ele-
ments are not questioned and the social context of any case is not
taken into consideration. 240 For example, the fact that violence is en-
demic in our society has never become an issue in any rape case.241 In
precisely this way, male patriarchy is evident in Alkhabaz because
there were no indications that the lawyers and judges took into con-
sideration the continued subordination of women in American
society.2 42
In not addressing the First Amendment concerns in Alkhabaz's
speech, thereby leaving women no choice but to allow this type of
speech to exist on the Internet, the court denied women their very
humanity. The fact that some of the e-mails were meant to be private
transmissions between Alkhabaz and Gonda does not make them so.
The e-mails can be considered public because they have the social
power to create a society in which women are systematically subordi-
nated to men. An opponent may argue that since the e-mails and In-
ternet stories were private and only accessible by choice, women were
not captive audiences to the sexually graphic and threatening speech
being communicated on the Internet, and further, the speech was not
forced into their homes, an area commonly mandating privacy protec-
tion. Similarly, an opponent may claim that since the obscenity was
not publicly displayed by any means of expression, other persons had
a meaningful opportunity to avoid reading the speech, thus, there was
no captive audience. Internet contact is "[u]nlike an unexpected out-
burst on a radio broadcast" and the obscenity received or contributed
by the user "[i]s not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an un-
willing [reader] from avoiding exposure to it."'243 Opponents of this
Note's reasoning will likely argue that users who log onto the sexually
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Becker, supra note 72, at 975 passim (commenting on judicial review and the con-
straints of stare decisis, and also discussing the negative impact of having a "small elite group of
lawyers, who are not politically accountable, be able to block legislation desired by a majority of
the citizens in a democracy").
243. Sable Comm. of Calif. v. FCC., 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (arguing that the "context of
dial-in services, where a caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is manifestly
different from the situation in which a listener does not want to receive the message"). See also
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
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explicit newsgroups or BBSs will not generally be unwilling readers or
contributors. These users will likely be intentionally logging onto the
newsgroup for the purpose of reading such obscene stories detailing
the sexual subordination of women for personal enjoyment. Thus, op-
ponents to regulation of the Internet will likely argue that women and
men who oppose obscenity on the Internet are able to "avert their
glances" and avoid the obscenity if they desire.244
While it is arguably true that a captive audience does not exist on
the Internet given the Internet's voluntary nature, the subordination
of women is perpetuated and is fostered by men who participate in
and contribute to sexual fantasies. The men who share such horrid,
misogynic fantasies or ideas subordinate women by believing and sup-
porting such ideas, spreading beliefs indulgent in savage thoughts to
other men, and acting upon such beliefs. The communication and en-
joyment of these sexual fantasies creates a communal and brotherly
acceptance of the desires and fantasies from one man to another. This
acceptance creates the grounds from which the status of women is up-
rooted and thrown away. The acceptance of sexual fantasies from
other men and judges functions to concentrate the oppression from
which the sexual threats are mounted as they reinforce the beliefs that
women are unequal to men and merit oppression, rape, torture, and
death.245
The inconsistencies in the Alkhabaz and Baker opinions, in defining
what constitutes a true threat, impaired the court's ability to find that
244. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that the government entity could
"avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes"). Nonetheless,
it is important to note that Cohen discusses the fact that persons "are often 'captives' outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech." Id. at 21. Therefore, opponents
will likely fail on this argument since Internet transmissions take place within the home more
often than outside the home. Women are subject to the Internet and its vast capabilities and
subordinating contents because of the fact that they have family members using the Internet,
they have friends that use the Internet, and they have co-workers that use the Internet. It is this
usage that implicitly subordinates women inside and outside their personal homes. Thus, the
ability to "avert their eyes" is not a viable option.
245. Laura J. Lederer, Pornography and Racist Speech as Hate Propaganda, in THE PRICE WE
PAY 131, 139 (995). The acceptance of men's fantasies are obvious in magazines such as Play-
boy and Hustler. Playboy allows men to believe that what they are contributing to is acceptable
and reinforces the thoughts of men by telling them it is tolerable to think that women are infer-
ior because other men believe the same thing. Id. at 139. "Hate mongers and pornographers
refer to higher authorities, famous people, experts, scholars, and other leaders to gain respecta-
bility." Id. One of the most clever programs supporting the campaign of subordinating women
is fashioned in "Playboy Magazine's Playboy interview, which has featured presidents, legisla-
tors, athletes, authors, artists, major sports figures . . . and Hollywood stars. ... Id. The
presence of such leaders "legitimizes the rest of the magazine's content." Id. at 139. See also
Bathrick & Kaufman, supra note 228, at 115 (noting how men try to describe, in reality, ways to
justify their position on women and male power).
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Alkhabaz's speech was in fact a true threat to continue the subordina-
tion of women. The court's error could have been easily prevented,
had Congress enacted a federal statute regulating Internet obscenity.
The Alkhabaz court erred when it held the e-mails and Internet sto-
ries were protected under the First Amendment. As demonstrated by
the application of Miller, the court should have characterized the
speech as obscene. Furthermore, the court erred in not holding that
the communications were true threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The
inconsistencies in Alkhabaz's trial and appellate court decisions im-
paired the court's ability to find that Alkhabaz's speech constituted
true threats of the continued subordination of women. Unfortunately,
the inconsistency between the courts was likely caused by inherent
biases of a court composed of men. Biases are inherent within a male
patriarchy, which is the premise of the current judicial system. None-
theless, the court's error could have been easily prevented had Con-
gress enacted a federal statute regulating obscenity on the Internet.
V. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE REGULATING OBSCENITY
ON THE INTERNET
Regardless of the definition the Sixth Circuit used to determine
whether Alkhabaz's e-mails and Internet stories were true threats, the
Internet communications should have been considered obscene under
the Miller test, and thus, not granted First Amendment protection.
For many years, the Supreme Court has been praised for its courage in
upholding First Amendment protections and recognizing the impor-
tance of the right to free speech. However, the Court has also recog-
nized that certain forms of speech are impermissible and that
individuals do not have an absolute ability to communicate their
desires.
Accordingly, the court's holding in Alkhabaz demonstrates the
need for Congress to enact a federal statute containing a national
standard of review to regulate obscenity on the Internet. The lack of
federal regulation on Internet obscenity has furthered the subordina-
tion of women, a problem visible not only in cyberspace, but also in
reality. The problems begin with the mild tactics of subordination
which are demonstrated when women are pushed, shoved, felt up, and
called dirty or foul names.2 46 Women generally try to ignore these
oppressive acts of violence and attempt to move past them. However,
246. Andrea Dworkin, Pornography Happens to Women, in THE PRICE WE PAY 181, 184
(1995). The mild tactics of subordinating women are important to point out because, amazingly
enough, it is acknowledged that had the pushing, touching, and name-calling been done to a man
it is likely that the invasions would have been considered physical attacks. Id.
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every time a man acts out sexual violence against a woman the subor-
dination intensifies. 247 Nonetheless, since the acts are done to women,
some members of society believe it is acceptable to treat women in
such a manner because that is the way things are in society. 248
A federal statute is needed to illustrate to every citizen that obscene
speech, regardless of its medium, is not considered speech under the
First Amendment, and thus, does not receive protection. Enacting a
federal statute that mandates a national standard for regulating ob-
scenity could thwart the continued subordination of women. How-
ever, in order to be effective, the proposed federal statute must define
a national standard for obscenity, rather than one based on a contem-
porary community standard, as seen in Miller. Additionally, the fed-
eral statute must design strict regulations for the Internet and
implement a system of enforcement that will fine Internet providers,
operators, and users who communicate or aid in the communication of
obscene speech.
A. Typical and Contemporary Community Standards
Most states throughout the nation have statutes that, under Miller,
define obscenity as material that the average person, when applying
contemporary community standards, finds appealing to the prurient
interests taken as a whole. Many state statutes, such as those from
Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Texas, are relatively consistent in
defining the standard for obscenity and failing to mention the Internet
as a possible medium for its transmission. For example, Illinois de-
fines obscenity as material that "describes, in a patently offensive way,
ultimate sexual acts or sadomasochistic sexual acts, whether normal or
perverted, actual or simulated, or masturbation, excretory functions or
lewd exhibitions of the genitals. '249 Louisiana defines obscenity as
material demonstrating hard core conduct such as "[s]adomasochistic
abuse, meaning actual, simulated or animated, flagellation, or torture
by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in cos-
tume that reveals the pubic hair ... or in the condition of being fet-
tered bound, or otherwise physically restrained. '250 In fact, most state
statutes, similar to that of Louisiana, usually find violent material de-
247. Id. In addition, when women "have their passage physically blocked on the street or in
the office; women simply move on, move through, unless the man escalates the violence to what
the larger patriarchal world takes to be real violence .... Id.
248. Id. Due to the fact that these acts are done to women, some members of society think
that the acts are terrible, but "that's the way things are; don't make a federal case out of it." Id.
249. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20 (West 1999).
250. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (West 1999).
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picting offensive acts of violence, including but not limited to, acts of
sadistic conduct, whippings, beatings, torture, and mutilation of the
human body, to be obscene. 251
New York and Texas rely heavily on whether the material is "pa-
tently offensive. ' 252 For example, New York maintains that obscene
material "depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner, actual
or simulated: sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturba-
tion, sadism, masochism, excretion or lewd exhibition of the genitals,
and considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
and scientific value. '253 Similarly, Texas defines obscenity as material
represented by "patently offensive representations or descriptions of
... sodomy... masturbation, sexual bestiality.., masochism.., the
male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, cov-
ered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state or a device designed
and marketed as useful primarily for stimulation. '254
The minor inconsistencies between state statutes defining obscenity
demonstrate that, while the standard of review is similar, there are still
differences regarding a state's tolerance level with respect to various
sexual acts. Hence, a sexual act that is tolerated in one state is not
always going to be tolerated in the neighboring jurisdictions. 255 The
ability for such minor, but disconcerting, inconsistencies demonstrates
the need for a federal statute to define and regulate obscenity on the
Internet. Furthermore, the federal statute would introduce a standard
which all states would follow and set the standard to be applied in
determining whether something is obscene. The states could raise the
standard of federal review to include more material as obscene, but a
state could never lower the standard.
B. The Elements of a Federal Statute Defining and Regulating
Obscenity on the Internet
In determining the elements of a federal statute defining obscenity,
a similar statute in neighboring Canada aids in the construction of a
statute for the United States. Canada's statute is an excellent model,
251. Id.
252. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00 (McKinney 1999); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon
1999).
253. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00 (McKinney 1999)
254. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon 1999).
255. Thomas Earl Pryor, Does Arkansas Code Section 15-14-122 Violate Arkansas's Constitu-
tional Guarantee of Equal Protection?, 51 ARK. L. REV. 521, n.21 (1998). See also GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-2 (West 2000) (criminalizing sodomy). Thirty-one states plus the District of Colum-
bia do not have sodomy statutes, such as Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and
North Dakota. See Pryor, supra at n.21).
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deserving the respect, support, and consideration of the United
States. 256 On February 27, 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada unani-
mously adopted the thesis that Canada's criminal obscenity law should
be broadened to apply to "materials that subordinate, degrade or de-
humanize women.125 7 The Canadian Criminal Obscenity Law defines
obscenity as follows: "Any publication, a dominant characteristic of
which is undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one of the follow-
ing subjects: crime, horror, cruelty, and violence. '258 Therefore, in or-
der to have a statute that can be easily interpreted by the states and
the users of the Internet, the proposed statute must define obscenity,
use a national standard of review, in contrast to a community stan-
dard, and implement penalties for violating the statute. Additionally,
in order to be considered constitutional under the Constitution of the
United States, the statute must not be overbroad and comply with
Congress' commerce clause power as acknowledged in United States v.
Lopez.259
1. Elements of a Federal Statute Regulating Obscenity
A federal statute that regulates obscenity on the Internet would de-
fine a national standard of review with definite guidelines which
would be easily understood by the fifty states. The federal statute
would define explicit harm, cruelty and subordination, and give exam-
ples of representations that would constitute the submissiveness of the
women. In addition, the federal statute would provide the penalties of
violating the statute. As a whole, the federal statute would clearly
define obscenity. In part, the statute would state as follows:
All material that explicitly harms women, depicts sexual violence,
cruelty against women, or subordinates women in a sexual context
will be considered obscene .... If the user transmits any obscene
256. Joan Kennedy Taylor, Gender Symposium: Does Sexual Speech Harm Women? The Split
Between Feminism, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 49, 51 (1994).
257. See id.
258. Butler v. The Queen, [1992] S.C.R. 452. "The court redefined undue exploitation ...
ruling that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protected the equality of women as
well as freedom of expression, and therefore in the name of equality sexually explicit materials
that harm women may be suppressed." Kennedy Taylor, supra note 256, at 51-52 (citing Camilla
Gibb, Project P Targets Lesbian Porn, QUOTA MAG., May 1992). But see NATIONAL COALITION
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, A CONFERENCE REPORT, THE SEX PANIC: WOMEN, CENSORSHIP, AND
"PORNOGRAPHY" 5 (1993). Thelma McCormack, professor of sociology at York University in
Ontario and director of the Center for Feminist Research commented on Canada's Supreme
Court decision in the 1992 Butler decision. Id. McCormack claimed that "[ajlthough the deci-
sion was hailed a great victory for feminist anti-porn forces, the Butler decision belongs to the
Right. The Supreme Court of Canada doesn't give a damn about gender equality. It is con-
cerned about control and was pleased to have a feminist gloss put on it." Id.
259. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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materials as defined above over the Internet with the knowledge of
the nature of the content thereof, with the intent to advertise, cre-
ate, possess with intent to disseminate, sponsor, sell, deliver, pro-
vide, offer to deliver, publish, or post, the user will be in violation of
the statute. If it is found that any of the depictions or descriptions
on the Internet are of sexual conduct described and declared as ob-
scene by a court of law by applying the national standard to have
been unlawfully transmitted on the Internet, the Internet provider,
author, and any other person sponsoring the obscene material will
be subject to a $5000 fine or five months in jail or both. 260
Canada's definition of obscenity may be broad, nonetheless, the
American federal statute outlined above would narrow the definition
of obscenity by further describing the meaning of the terms horror,
cruelty, violence, and crime. For example, explicit harm and cruelty
portrayed in a sexual context would be demonstrated with the use of
bigotry, hostility, pain, coercion, subordination, and misogynous ag-
gression against women. Material could also be defined as obscene
when: (1) the use of violence or other acts of crime are depicted
through one person inflicting serious bodily harm on another; (2) the
participant did not consent before the production of the material; or
(3) a participant in the production of the material was a minor.261
260. The statute in full would resemble something like this:
Obscenity is all material that explicitly demonstrates harm being done to another
person, depicts sexual violence or cruelty against that person, or subordinates that per-
son in a sexual context.
Explicit harm and cruelty include the sexual context of one or more of the following:
(i) bigotry; or (ii) hostility; or (iii) pain; or (iv) coercion; or (v) subordination; or (vi)
misogynous aggression against women; or (vii) degradation; or (viii) dehumanization.
The sexual or social subordination of women includes the representation of one or
more of the following: (i) women as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(ii) women as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iii)
women as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
(iv) women submissive to men.
The depiction of women submissive to men includes the representation of one or
more of the following: (i) women in postures of sexual submission; or (ii) women as
whores by nature; or (iii) women being penetrated by objects or animals; or (iv) women
in scenarios of degradation, or injury, or torture, or shown as filthy or inferior, or bleed-
ing, or bruised, or hurt, in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
Upon the transmission of any obscene material, as defined above, with the knowl-
edge of the nature of the content thereof, with the intent to advertise, create, possess
with the intent to disseminate, sponsor, sell, deliver, provide, offer to deliver, publish or
post in interstate or intrastate commerce, including the Internet, a court shall by apply-
ing the national standard declare the material as obscene and find the person in viola-
tion of the statute.
Upon declaring the material as obscene the Internet provider, author, and any other
party sponsoring the obscene material will be subject to a $5000 fine or five months in
jail or both.
261. This statute extracts some ideas from the MacKinnon-Dworkin model definition of por-
nography. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Material that subordinates or dehumanizes women to men would be
considered obscene if the women are presented as sexual objects who
experience sexual pleasure in being raped, or as sexual objects tied-
up, cut-up, mutilated, bruised, innately physically hurt, or as sexual
objects who enjoy pain and humiliation.262 The ability to portray
women as submissive to men or inferior in our society is demonstrated
by depicting women in postures of sexual submission, women as
whores by nature, women being penetrated by objects or animals,
women in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or
inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt, in a context that makes these con-
ditions sexual. 263
The federal statute would make the transmission of obscenity over
the Internet a federal offense. Furthermore, since the Internet is com-
prised of, but not limited to, e-mail, Usenet, and any newsgroup or
BBS, any other Internet facility introduced in the future or not ex-
pressly mentioned in the statute would fall within the statue's bounda-
ries and federal jurisdiction. Thus, the federal statute would recognize
the infinite realm of cyberspace.
2. National Standard Defined
The theory of the contemporary community standard found in
Miller is difficult to uphold in a jurisdiction that has no boundaries.264
Due to the availability of obscene materials on the Internet, the lack
of jurisdiction over cyberspace, and the inability to prosecute obscen-
ity offenders on the Internet, a national standard of review is neces-
sary. In general, obscenity prosecutions are quite rare due to the
difficulty in establishing material as obscene under the Miller test,
therefore, the standard of review for the locale in which the suit is
being brought cannot be applied in cases involving the Internet.265
Jurisdictional problems arise when looking at the structure of cyber-
space and the imposition of liability on Internet users and sponsors for
illegal postings, such as obscenity, which is not protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, due to the lack of jurisdiction over cyberspace,
the contemporary community standards test must be viewed as inap-
plicable. The Sixth Circuit has held that the "venue for federal ob-
scenity prosecutions lies 'in any district from, through, or into which'
262. This statute extracts some ideas from the MacKinnon-Dworkin model definition of por-
nography. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
263. This statute extracts some ideas from the MacKinnon-Dworkin model definition of por-
nography. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
265. Bilstad, supra note 43, at 363.
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the allegedly obscene material moves .... "266 Therefore, the court
can decide which community standard it will apply if there is more
than one. Unfortunately, "[t]his may result in prosecutions of persons
in a community to which they have sent materials which [are] obscene
under that community's standards though the community from which
it is sent would tolerate the same material. ' 267 Hence, in order to
maintain fairness and consistency, the regulation of obscenity on the
Internet must be confined within the application of a uniform national
standard.
A uniform national standard of review for obscenity would allow
the fifty states to clearly and undoubtedly recognize material that por-
trays women as being socially and sexually subordinated, beaten,
raped, tortured, mutilated, or murdered as obscene. In conforming to
a national standard, courts would not need to question in which juris-
diction the obscene material was processed, accessed, sold, bought,
posted, or moved through. A national obscenity standard would allow
Internet providers, moderators, and operators to know whether they
are in compliance with the law on a national level, and need only fur-
ther investigate to determine whether they are in compliance with
their local standard which may be more strict, or more encompassing
than the national standard.268 For example, a federal statute that ex-
plicitly defined the law on obscenity and its relative standard of re-
view, in relation to the Internet, would allow moderators of BBSs to
apply definite guidelines to e-mails or stories requesting to be posted
on the Internet.
Definite guidelines are imperative to a nation composed of multiple
vague and indefinite community standards. These guidelines would
enable the prosecution of offenders because the standard would be
consistent and easily understood, thus, the possibility of mistake or
lack of knowledge on behalf of the user would be slim, if nonexistent.
Currently, community standards are inconsistent and easily misunder-
stood because they differ from community to community, and inflict
punishments on some people but not others who engage in the same
266. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996). This case involved one of the
first federal criminal convictions for transmitting obscene materials over the Internet as applied
to 18 U.S.C. § 3237. Id. The defendants in Thomas were convicted of federal obscenity charges
concerning their operation of a computer bulletin board business known as the Amateur Action
Computer Bulletin Board System. Id. at 705.
267. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711.
268. Remember that under the federal statute, states could heighten the level of scrutiny, but
never lower it. Thus, if a state had a higher standard, the user would need to qualify under the
federal statute and then look to the state statute as well. However, it is likely that a federal
statute would remain the primary statute looked to for guidance.
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criminality. The application of a community standard in defining ob-
scenity on the Internet is analogous to one state criminalizing murder
and one state endorsing murder merely because the state is more tol-
erant. For example, what may be tolerated in Chicago, Illinois, may
not be tolerated in Fargo, North Dakota. 269 The differing viewpoints
of what constitutes obscenity in these communities is likely due to va-
rious societal factors including tolerance of minority viewpoints, racial
diversity, religious diversity, and population.270 Therefore, a national
standard would rectify the problem of inconsistent application of fed-
eral law and inconsistent tolerance levels. As illustrated in Alkhabaz
and Baker, courts would have to only focus on one standard of review.
Thus, obscene Internet speech that portrays women being tortured in
one community would be considered obscene across the nation.
3. The Inherent Need to Control Obscene Speech Would be
Accomplished by a National Standard
The United States Supreme Court has held that defining and main-
taining a national standard for obscenity in the face of constantly
changing ideas of morality provides a great obstacle to implementing
a national standard, such as the one this Note proposes.27' However,
269. For example, the moral fabric of some rural communities located in the Midwest does not
allow members of society to participate in sexually orientated businesses, but the moral fabric of
society in large cities, such as Chicago, Illinois, may be more tolerant of such businesses. See
Marilynn Wheeler, Fargo Nixes Mix of Nude Dancing Bars, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 19, 1995, at
10A. "The Fargo City Commission on Monday voted 4-1 to ban exotic dancing in bars .... Id.
However, the Commission's ban did "not prohibit exotic dancing in any other venue that [was]
not serving alcoholic beverages."
27(0. The population of Chicago, Illinois, is 2,802,079 and the population of Fargo, North Da-
kota, is 170,122. THE WORLD ALMANAC ANI) BOOK OF FAcTs 2001 (Beth R. Ellis, eds., 2001).
The total population for North Dakota is 642,200. U.S. Census Bureau: American Factfinder,
North Dakota (2000), available at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). Of the
total population of North Dakota, 593,181 are white, 3,916 are African American, 31,329 are
American Indian and Alaska Native, and 3,606 are Asian. Id. Thus, 93 percent of the total
population is white. Id. The total population for the State of Illinois is 12.5 million. Id. Of the
racial composition of Illinois, 1.9 million are African Americans, 10.1 million are white, 31,000
are American Indian and Alaska Native, and 423,000 are Asian. Id.
271. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. The Miller Court rejected the notion of a national standard of
review:
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on the pow-
ers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this does not mean
that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what
appeals to the 'prurient interests' or is 'patently offensive.'
Id. Nonetheless, it could be argued that due to the fact that women make up over 51 percent of
the nation's population, a majority of the nation could agree that speech that portrays women
being sexually and physically subordinated should be regulated, considered obscene, and thus
not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. See Population Estimates Program, Pop-
ulation Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C., Oct. 25, 2000 (detailing the residential
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regardless of the change in societal morality, the fact that obscenity is
not protected by the First Amendment has not and likely will not
change in the future. In regard to whether the definition of obscenity
will change because of increased tolerance levels in society, it is
doubtful that reasonable members of society, women included, will
tolerate the portrayal of women being beaten, raped, and sexually
subordinated.
If society does begin to tolerate this type of obscene speech, mem-
bers of society may have to confront some serious issues. Society may
need a federal statute to restrict the moral structure of the nation.
Perhaps it will be necessary for society to be reminded every once in a
while that obscene speech implicates a woman's status in society. It
may be necessary for citizens to have their thoughts and ideas con-
trolled and regulated if they are obscene, discuss the mutilation of
women, and lack value to society. If society's morals are not re-
stricted or controlled, the amount of obscenity on the Internet will
continue to increase, women will lose their status in society, and the
nation will once again become a slave nation.272
C. Obscenity is Violence Against Women
It may be difficult to find scientific evidence which confirms that
obscenity implicates violence against women. Nonetheless, there
must undoubtedly be an empirical link indicative of the causal rela-
tionship between obscenity and violence against women. The subordi-
nation of women is an inherent factor in the nation's continual rise in
the physical and emotional harm done to women every day.
population of the United States, in thousands, as being 140 million females and 135 million
males).
272. ANDREA DWORKIN, The Slavery of Women in Amerika, in OUR BLOOD 76-95 (1975)
(commenting on the slavery of women and the few victories women have won in the fight to-
wards equality). Dworkin focuses on male domination over women and how women are the one
thing that men will always have control over, in a slave nation such as America. Id. at 82. "This
nation's history is one of spilled blood .... This is a nation built on slave labor, slaughter, and
grief. This is a racist nation, a sexist nation, a murderous nation. This is a nation pathologically
seized by the will to domination." Id. at 77. Furthermore,
"[elvery married man, no matter how poor, owned one slave-his wife. Every married
man, no matter how powerless compared to other men, had absolute power over one
slave-his wife. Every married man, no matter what his rank in the world of men, was
tyrant and master over one woman-his wife.
Id. at 82. Dworkin carries the control married men have over their wives to non-married men
and their "brutal and absolute authority over the bodies of women [and] ruthless and malicious
tyranny over the hearts, minds, and destinies of women." Id. Within a so-called slave nation
men reveled in their power and identified women as "chattel [or] animals to be fucked and to
breed." Id.
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1. Obscenity is Violence
"Nudity, excess of candor, arousal or excitement, prurient appeal,
illegality of the acts depicted, and unnaturalness or perversion" are all
celebrated in obscene material.2 73 These depictions illustrate sex
forced on women, and when these depictions are communicated or
read on the Internet, they are physically forced on other women. In
most obscene material posted on the Internet, women's bodies are
"trussed and maimed and raped and made into things to be hurt and
obtained and accessed. '274 Presenting women in this nature induces
many men to physically act on the depictions. 275 The way in which
obscenity subordinates women is visible to women, however, this phe-
nomenon is remarkably invisible to men. As a result, the threat of
societal harm to women is constant.276
Women who are withdrawn, robbed of their humanity, of their abil-
ity to have emotions, or of their ability to live, may sexually thrill and
arouse some men. The active and explicit domination of women
through the communicated images of bondage, torture, and murder
give some men mental pleasure.277 For some, the dismemberment of
women, either physically or socially, is the only thing that can give
men pleasure and increase their self-esteem.278 Obscene speech is it-
self sexual violence against women, and Alkhabaz sexually violated
and threatened all women and their personal security when he posted
his obscene stories on the Internet.
There is a need for the regulation of individual rights, such as the
right to free speech, when the exercise of that right causes severe inva-
sions into the rights of others, whether immediately identifiable vic-
tims or the community itself.279 Alkhabaz's speech may not have
caused women physical harm by itself, although we do not know if
someone has tried to copycat the Jane Doe Story, however the speech
273. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Francis Biddles's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 70, at 327.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. BEYOND PATRIARCHY, supra note 47, at 99.
278. Id. Horowitz and Kaufman agree that obscenity and pornography are "brash state-
ments" of male power because the depictions of women portray the false availability of women,
women's vulnerability, reduction of women to sexual parts, and women being defiled or dismem-
bered. Id.
279. Heyman, supra note 162, at 1319 (explaining women's rights to personal security in great
detail).
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did sexually dehumanize women.280 The speech treated women as
mere objects that have no intrinsic value and deserve to feel pain.
It could be argued that Alkhabaz's speech constituted a physical
assault to women since it inflicted injury, not only to the body, but
also to the consciousness of the victim. 28' Thus, a threat of harmful or
offensive contact to the body may be perceived as a threat to the
safety of one's dignity and undermine one's sense of authority in rela-
tion to one's own body.282 In this way, Alkhabaz's e-mail and Internet
stories make women feel as though they have lost control of their sta-
tus in society. A cyclical event begins because if one man possesses
such ideas about women, the number of men with similar ideas can
only escalate, and the subordination of women will inevitably turn
into a continual process.
Obscenity threatens and violates personal security through its direct
impact on the minds of women. Even if a woman does not have direct
contact with obscenity, she will feel the impact of the speech through
societal subordination against her status as a woman. If the woman
has direct contact with the threats, then her personal security and op-
pression is immediately experienced and acknowledged.
The reactions to the Jane Doe Story are often strong. The fact that
a person actually thought up such a horrid act sheds light on the con-
cept that such acts of misogyny could happen to anyone. The silenc-
ing of women often occurs after having contact with such obscenity;
thus, silence or shock are common reactions after reading the story.283
The impact of obscenity on the Internet is similar to the modern day
allowance of pornography in the mass media. The harm of
Alkhabaz's e-mail and Internet stories directs harm to a specific, dis-
280. Id. at 1322 ("The communicative aspect of expression is capable of violating personal
security .... "). Heyman described the way in which some communication has the same impact
as battery, as illustrated in Alcorn v. Mitchell and Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel. Id. In Al-
corn, "a litigant spat in his adversary's face in the presence of a large number of people in the
courtroom," and in Fisher, "a NASA scientist was standing in a [lunchroom] ... when the restau-
rant's manager snatched a plate out of his hand and shouted that he could not be served there
because of his race." Id. at 1322. See Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Il. 553 (1872); Fisher v. Carrousel
Motor Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). Both acts consisted of offensive contact and thus
constituted battery. Heyman, supra 162, at 1322. The "greatest element of offense derived from
the contempt that the acts expressed and the humiliation that they were intended to inflict" thus,
the acts themselves were communicated for the purpose of insult and indignity. Heyman, supra
note 162, at 1322.
281. Id. at 1322. "[A]ssault is an injury to consciousness in its own right, and is therefore the
most subjective injury." Id.
282. Id. at 1323.
283. Michelle J. Anderson, Silencing Women's Speech, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 233,
at 122-24 (describing the speech patterns between men and women, specifically "aspects of
men's speech patterns that 'chill' women's speech ...").
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advantaged group of women, 28 4 and encourages rape, sexualizes domi-
nance, and enforces the continued societal subordination of women.
2. Obscenity is Education
The effects from the encouragement of rape, sexual dominance, and
subordination can be observed in recent case law. Certain cases re-
flect the fact that some men, who commit sexually violent acts against
women, or murder women in a sexual manner, have admitted to in-
dulging in obscene materials accessible to them before committing the
crime.285 Obscene materials do not only fall into the hands of grown
men, but also in the developing hands of the nation's young men and
284. Id. at 123. See also Laura J. Lederer, Pornography and Racist Speech as Hate Propa-
ganda; in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 245, at 136 (commenting on how name calling plays a
special role in dehumanizing people). Everyday we hear dozens of inhuman terms for females:
"cunt," "twat," "bitch," "whore," and "piece of ass." Id. Similarly, women are often referred to
in animal or food contexts: "bunnies," "pet," "chicks," "cows," "sows," "kittens," and "lambs;"
or named "Taffy," "Candy," or "Cookie." Id.
285. Minnesota v. Herberg, 324 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. 1982) (describing the various sexual
acts that the defendant asked his kidnapped fourteen year old female victim to perform, includ-
ing ordering her to remove her clothes and his also). In Herberg, the defendant forced his victim
to perform horrid acts, of which he had seen performed or read about in movies, books, and
magazines.
He then made her stick a safety pin into the nipple of her left breast. He then forced
her to ask him to hit her. After hitting her, he forced her to commit fellatio and to
submit to anal penetration. He made her use a cigarette to burn herself on a breast and
near the pubic area. He then defecated and urinated on her face, forcing her to ingest
some of the excrement and urine. He then made her urinate in a cup and drink it. He
then took a string from her blouse and choked her to the point of unconsciousness,
leaving burn marks on her neck. Then, after cutting her with his knife in a couple of
places, he drove her back to the area from which he had abducted her and released her.
Id.
The books that were seized from the defendants home were Violent Stories of Kinky Humilia-
tion, Violent Stories of Dominance and Submission, Bizarre Sex Crimes: Shamed Victims, and
Watersport Fetish: Enemas and Golden Showers. Id. See also Illinois v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702,
707 (I1. 1992) (discussing how a husband rammed his fist, holding a raw egg in its shell, several
inches into his wife's vagina and the husband's claim that the injuries occurred accidentally dur-
ing a form of sex play which he had copied from a pornographic movie). For a discussion on the
theory that pornography and obscenity produce imminent lawless activity in those who contrib-
ute to the pornography and obscenity industry, see Edward Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect
on Violence Against Women, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 53 (Neil M.
Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION:
RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 34-41 (1984); Mimi H. Silbert &
Ayala M. Pines, Pornography and Sexual Abuse of Women: 10 Sex Roles, in FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 314, 314-15; Neil M. Malamuth & James V.P. Check, Penile
Tumescence and Perceptual Responses to Rape as a Function of Victims Perceived Reactions, 10 J.
AP'LIED SOC. PSYCH. 528 (1980), Diana E.H. Russell, Pornography and Rape: A Causal Model,
9 POL. PSYCH. 41, 68 (1988).
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boys. 286 The obscenity available on the Internet can be reached by
young people every day. In the end, the material only serves to teach
these youths an unhealthy form of sexuality.
For the first time in history, there are children whose earliest sexual
imprinting is derived not from a living human being, or their adoles-
cent fantasies, but rather from mass produced, deliberately dehuman-
izing images of women on the Internet. 287 Multiple studies have been
conducted to show how obscenity impacts adolescent males. One
study demonstrated that males learned many of their sexual lessons
from pornographic or obscene reading materials.288 Not surprisingly,
this study illustrated that young men learned that the use of force dur-
ing sex can be related to feelings of excitement and stimulation.28 9
Young men also learned that force can be justified if the female was
active in the sexual act. 290 Male adolescents are learning more than
what their sex education books are offering when confronted with ob-
scenity on the Internet. They are confronted with the false myth that
domination is connected with pleasure, and that the only way to feel
pleasure is to exploit and physically harm women.291
This phenomenon can be observed as a recurring cycle between
young boys and the men they grow up to become. Some men desper-
ately want women to desire possession, cruelty, and dehumaniza-
tion. 292 A recent study found that men who viewed material showing
women being raped, tortured, and enjoying pain were less sympathetic
toward women who had been raped.293 In addition, these men trivial-
ized the trauma of rape by believing that women lie about sexual as-
sault.294 Some men have been shown to view women as less than
equal and display decreased sympathy toward sexual inequality than
before. 295 Furthermore, some studies have found that individuals ex-
posed to pornographic or obscene materials responded with blunted
286. Michelle J. Anderson, Silencing Women's Speech, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 233,
at 122. "Nine out of ten boys ... have seen at least one pornographic video in their lives and
one-third of boys ... consume pornography more than once a month." Id.
287. Id.
288. James Check, Teenage Training: The Effects of Pornography on Adolescent Males, in THE
PRICE WE PAY 89, 90 (1995).
289. Id. at 89-90.
290. Id. at 90.
291. Id. at 91.
292. Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Feminist!Political Approach: Pleasure under Patriarchy, in
THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 65, 76 (James H. Geer & William T. O'Donohue eds. 1987).
293. Michelle J. Anderson, Silencing Women's Speech, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 233,
at 126.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 126.
20011 1045
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sensitivity to violence against women, attained callused attitudes
about rape, felt sexually aroused when confronted with rape depic-
tions and laboratory simulations, showed aggression toward women,
or demonstrated other antisocial responses.296
D. Enforcing the Federal Statute
A uniform federal statute regulating obscenity on the Internet
would be upheld by the United States Supreme Court and followed by
the individual Internet providers. The United States Supreme Court
would have the task of determining whether the Congressional legisla-
tion violated the Constitution's First Amendment.297 Once the Con-
stitutional issue has been addressed, the local and national Internet
providers, as well as law enforcement agencies, would need to enforce
the statute using every means possible. Nonetheless, the ability to
regulate obscenity on the Internet should not be that difficult.
"In the modern world of Internet anarchy, such fears of liability"
would induce Internet and network operators to react to a federal
statute by either shutting down their bulletin board altogether, se-
verely limiting its access to known users, moderating the stories before
posting them, or searching every file and deleting those that the ad-
ministrator believes contain obscene material. 298 As noted, some
Usenet BBSs are presently regulated by moderators who are able to
weed through the content of the stories and post only those that are
not in violation of the bulletin board requirements. 299 Further, there
would be no difficulty in determining what community standard the
administrator was required to apply because a federal statute would
mandate the use of a national standard.
Objections to the regulation of obscenity on the Internet will likely
take the form of rejecting governmental power to regulate some "un-
popular" speech on the Internet, thus, stimulating a chilling effect on
societal speech in the marketplace of ideas and a potential abuse of
the regulating power. However, what objectors to this federal statute
must remember is that obscenity is not protected by the First Amend-
ment. Thus, a federal statute applying a national standard of review is
296. EDWARD I. DONNERSTEIN, DANIAL LINZ, & STEVEN PENROD, THE QUESTION OF POR-
NOGRAPHY: RESEARCH FINDING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 5 (1987).
297. "[Djeference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry where First Amendment
rights are at stake." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 485 U.S. 829, 843 (1975).
298. Robert F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the Internet: The
Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV.
1075, 1078 (1995) (noting that current fears of Internet liability has led to various forms of cen-
sorship, raising serious constitutional questions about when censorship goes too far).
299. See supra note 38-41 and accompanying text.
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only going to aid the technological nation in policing and regulating
the infinite amount of obscene speech in cyberspace.
E. Current Internet Regulation
Regulating the Internet is not a new idea, and the current forms of
regulation are not limited. With the continually increasing amount of
Internet commerce, shopping and the performance of other business
transactions over the Internet, the need for government or private
regulation of the Internet has become a necessity. For example, buy-
ing prescription drugs online has become an easy and convenient
method of shopping for young and old people alike. "Like many pro-
fessions, pharmacists are regulated by the states.300 Anyone who fills
prescriptions for residents of a particular state is supposed to be li-
censed in that state. '30 1 However, since the Internet lacks jurisdic-
tional boundaries, and "the absence of federal regulation, the
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy has instituted a volun-
tary certification program called Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice
Sites, or VIPPS. ''302 VIPPS places its seal of approval on licensed
pharmacies in order for consumers to know which e-pharmacies are
approved. 30 3 "VIPPS certification requires that online pharmacies be
licensed in every state to which they ship drugs. In addition, sites
must meet standards for patient privacy, quality assurance, authentica-
tion, and security of prescriptions and communication between pa-
tients and pharmacists. '30 4 Similarly, in accordance with regulation of
the Internet, Illinois recently enacted a bill that allows the state to
regulate drug sales over the Internet. 30 5 The Illinois Department of
Professional Responsibility enforces mail-order pharmacy regulations
300. "Pharmaceutical drugs are regulated by the federal government, but pharmacies and doc-
tors are controlled by the states." Gil Klein, Who's Minding The Net Shops? Legislatures DIS-
cuss Regulating Pharmacies, RICHMOND TIMES, July 31, 1999, at A2.
301. Rita Rubin, Easier-to-Swallow way to get your pills refilled E-pharmacies offer conve-
nience but raise safety concerns, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 1999, at ID. See also Klein, supra note 300
("Federal regulators said they still are working out who has jurisdiction. And they don't want to
damage fledgling e-commerce in a wave of new regulation.").
302. Rita Rubin, supra note 301, at 1D. See also Lauren R. Rubin, The Hazards of Buying
Drugs Online: How some fly-by-night sites raise the risk to patients, BARRON'S, May 17, 1999, at
H5, H6 (commending the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy step toward "protecting
the public from dubious web-based operators by developing a voluntary verification program
. .. 1').
303. Rita Rubin, supra note 301, at 1D. Drugstore.com, planetrx.com, and Merck-Medco RX
Services are three sites displaying the VIPPS seal. Lauren R. Rubin, supra note 302, at H5.
304. Id.
305. Ryan signs body-piercing bill, approves 66 other measures, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999
at 9.
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over the Internet and establishes additional rules for such pharmaceu-
tical transactions. 30 6
Additionally, states have initiated regulation of online gaming ser-
vices. "Traditional gaming has been strictly controlled and regulated"
by the states, "[h]owever, the internet is a global medium of communi-
cation that spans the borders and jurisdictions" of many states,30 7 thus,
suggesting a need for the federal regulation of wagering transactions.
Supporters have noted that the regulation of gaming on the Internet
would not necessarily entail regulating the Internet as a whole, but
rather regulating gambling products that are provided over the In-
ternet.3118 For example, Nevada enacted legislation that made "In-
ternet gaming a crime, unless the wager is placed with a state-licensed
sports book or casino. ' 30 9 The regulation of Internet gaming would
ensure the fairness of the games and address issues concerning the
integrity of the games, access by minors, and compulsive gambling
"without throwing sand in the gears of frictionless commerce on the
Internet." 310
Interestingly, most proposals for regulating the Internet have
stressed the fact that the regulation would not chill the active com-
merce on the Internet, but merely protect the consumers and Internet
participants whether they are gambling, or purchasing prescription
drugs. Thus, with the nation's interest in view, and the current regula-
tions placed on Internet activity, it is easy to see that regulating ob-
scenity on the Internet would also be possible.
Vt. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL STATUTE REGULATING
OBSCENITY ON THE INTERNET
The United States Congress has the power to prohibit the transmis-
sion of obscene communications on the Internet. A similar situation
arose in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission.31' In Sable Communications, the Supreme
Court held that the total prohibition of obscene interstate commercial
telephone communications under 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(b) did not violate
306. Id.
307. Sue Schneider, Internet Gambling Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, 105th Cong.
104 (1998) (statement by Sue Schneider, Chairwoman, Interactive Gaming Council, 1998 WL
8991992).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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the free speech provisions of the First Amendment. 312 Justice Byron
White, writing for a unanimous court, held that the protection of the
First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech, therefore the
prohibition of obscene telephone communications did not contravene
the requirement that obscenity be determined by contemporary com-
munity standards. 313
In all likelihood, the constitutionality of a federal statute regulating
obscenity on the Internet would eventually reach the Supreme Court.
In addition, it is likely that the statute would fall within the Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez.314 Lo-
pez stands unceasingly for the principle that the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution entrusts in Congress the power to "regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian Tribes. '315 The Constitution "created a legal system un-
precedented in form and design, establishing two orders of govern-
ment, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set
of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it. ' '316 Additionally, Lopez underscores the point that
the federal government is limited and restricted to those enumerated
powers proclaimed through the Constitution, which includes limita-
tions upon Commerce Clause litigation when the subject matter is tra-
ditionally regulated by the state, such as obscenity.317 Yet, under the
plain logic of Lopez, the argument for congressional power to regulate
obscenity on the Internet under the Commerce Clause appears
certain.
A. United States v. Lopez
In Lopez, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990, which Congress
312. Id. at 124-25 (explaining that "section 223(b) does not unconstitutionally prohibit the
interstate transmission of obscene telephone messages") Id.
313. Id. at 124. The Court did not read section 223(b) "as contravening the 'contemporary
community standards' requirement of Miller v. California ..... Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
314. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
315. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-53.
316. Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28 RUTGERS L. J. 825,
826 (1997) (quoting United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 709 (1995)).
317. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 59 (1997) (asserting that under the plain logic
of Lopez, the argument for a congressional power to regulate abortion under the Interstate
Commerce Clause seems dubious at best). For a brief overview of the history of the Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, see Charis Mincavage, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: Can it
Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake of United States v. Lopez?, 102 DICK. L. REV.
441, 448-50 (1998) (presenting a historical review of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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passed under its Commerce Clause authority. 318 The GFSZA made it
a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual [knew], or [had] reasonable cause to be-
lieve, [was] a school zone. '319 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist held that the GFSZA was unconstitutional be-
cause the possession of a gun in a school zone did not constitute eco-
nomic activity that substantially effected interstate commerce. 320
Thus, the Court determined that "the Act exceeds the authority of
Congress [t]o regulate commerce .... "321
Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce is limited to
three categories of interstate activity. 322 First, Congress "may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce," which includes keep-
ing the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injuri-
ous uses.323 Second, Congress can "regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce," including persons or
things.324 Third, Congress can regulate activities that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce.325
Nonetheless, Justice William Rehnquist identified several deficien-
cies within the GFSZA in determining its unconstitutionality. 326 The
Court held that not only did the GFSZA have nothing to do with in-
terstate commerce, or any other sort of economic enterprise, but also
that it "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element[s] which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affect[ed] interstate commerce. ' 327 The other problems the Court dis-
covered in Lopez concerned the lack of legislative history or findings
connecting the relationship between the possession of a gun within
1,000 feet of a school and interstate commerce. 328 Furthermore, if the
GFSZA was affirmed, it would upset the federal-state balance of
318. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
319. Id. at 551.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 558-59. See also Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 317, at 60.
323. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).
324. Id. at 558 (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding
amendments to the Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in interstate commerce)).
325. Id. at 558-59.
326. Id. at 559-62.
327. Id. at 561. "[T]here [wals no indication that [Lopez] had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie
to interstate commerce." Id. at 567.
328. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
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power.329 The finality of the Lopez opinion "relaxed the commerce
power test to a level of all-inclusiveness," and yet, reflected the
Court's desire to "limit further expansion of the Commerce
Clause." 330
B. Applying the Lopez Test to a Federal Statute Regulating
Obscenity on the Internet
The Lopez test begins by evaluating the federal statute's nexus with
interstate commerce and determining whether the statute regulates a
commercial or economic activity. If a commercial or economic activ-
ity is involved, then substantial deference will be given to Congress.
33
'
The federal statute would uniformly regulate the posting or transmis-
sion of obscene speech or depictions over the Internet. Although the
proposed statute does not specifically define the regulation of obscen-
ity as economic or commercial in nature, an argument can be made
that regulating obscenity on the Internet is as economically important
as prohibiting discrimination against women in the workplace. As
noted, depictions of subordinated women tend to perpetuate the sub-
ordination of women, and "[t]he subordinate status of women in turn
leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home,
[and] battery and rape on the streets. ' 332 Thus, a court could reasona-
bly characterize a statute regulating obscenity on the Internet as being
economic in nature.
The Lopez test raises the issue of whether the federal statute in-
cludes a judicial hook which incorporates a case-by-case Commerce
Clause analysis. In addressing this issue, the federal statute itself is
the hook because it forces Internet networks, providers, subscribers,
moderators, and users to read sexual stories posted via the multiple
modes of Internet technology and engage in a case-by-case analysis of
329. Id. at 564-68. To uphold the GFSZA, the Court would have had to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
states. Id. at 567.
330. Peter Arey Gilbert, The Migratory Bird Rule After Lopez: Questioning the Value of State
Sovereignty in the Context of Wetland Regulation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1695, 1724-75 (1998).
"Lopez suggests that the Commerce Clause test need not be strictly confined to the traditional
nexus. When a regulation proves difficult to evaluate with the traditional commerce power test
... the court may broaden the scope of its inquiry to evaluate the regulation." Id. at 1725. For
further analysis of the application of Lopez to federal statutes, see Kopel & Reynolds, supra
note 317, at 59-65; Mincavage, supra note 317, at 459-70; Megan Weinstein, The Violence Against
Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act from Constitutional Challenge, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 127-30 (1997).
331. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61 (explaining that even in cases where the nexus is weak, the
Court will sustain the exercise of commerce power).
332. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
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each transmission in order to determine whether the transmission is
obscene under the national standard, thus, justifying federal
regulation.
Under the Lopez test, a final factor in evaluating the nexus with
interstate commerce is an examination of the legislative findings. Un-
fortunately, only antecdotal data demonstrates that depictions of sub-
ordinated women actually perpetuates the continued subordination of
women. "The social science studies are very difficult to interpret,
however, and they conflict. Because much of the effect of speech
comes through a process of socialization, it is difficult to measure in-
cremental benefits and injuries caused by particular speech. '333 For
example, several psychologists have found that those who see violent
sexually explicit films tend to have more violent thoughts.334 None-
theless, whether viewing or reading obscenity actually leads to vio-
lence is a question that may never be answered scientifically. Thus,
there are no direct scientific findings of fact that support the clear
logic and empirical facts upon which the federal statute regulating ob-
scenity is based.
Initially, due to the lack of legislative findings of scientific facts, and
the difficulty a court may have in characterizing obscenity on the In-
ternet as economic in nature, an opponent would likely find this stat-
ute unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the fact that a federal statute
regulating obscenity on the Internet may not have a clear nexus with
interstate commerce is not debilitating because the Lopez test allows
for further scrutiny to determine if the statute regulates an area that is
traditionally of state concern.335
Since the regulation of obscenity has traditionally been left to state
and local authorities, it is clear that the statute does, initially, infringe
"on territory traditionally reserved to the states. ' 336 However, the
question remains "whether sustaining the statute would effectively ob-
literate the constitutionally contemplated boundaries between federal
and state sovereignty" or more succinctly, whether sustaining the stat-
ute would open the floodgates to litigation and expand Congress'
commerce power.337
333. Id. at 329 n.2.
334. Id.
335. Gilbert, supra note 330, at 1727. "This is the first consideration in examining the impact
that sustaining the law would have on the structure of government." Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1728. "[P]roponents of the [statute] would need to demonstrate that the logic be-
hind the [statute] would not open the door to a regulatory parade of horribles in which Congress
could expand the federal commerce power without limits." Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-68).
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One may argue that such a federal statute would open the flood-
gates toward regulating all speech that described or portrayed women
in a sexual manner, including the regulation of Internet web pages
that transmit pictures of women posing naked or participating in sex-
ual acts that normally qualify as soft porn or erotica. 338 However, the
statute does not regulate all speech depicting women in a sexual man-
ner or a sexual position. Rather, the statute merely regulates obscene
and constitutionally unprotected speech as defined under the statute.
The clear logic behind a federal statute regulating obscenity is based
on the fact that obscene speech on the Internet continues the subordi-
nation of women. Furthermore, this clear logic is supported by the
additional fact that the federal government is better situated to regu-
late obscenity on the Internet than a state government. Thus, since
the federal government is better situated, both financially and legally
to regulate and "accomplish effectively the goals of" the statute, the
constitutional presumption of deference to state sovereignty should,
therefore, not apply to the federal regulation of obscenity. 339 "The
logic upon which Congress reserved regulatory power to the states
breaks down when that regulatory power is directed towards an activ-
ity, the cost and benefits of which are not confined substantially within
the borders of individual states. '340 Obscenity on the Internet and its
continuing effect of the subordination of women impacts the interests
of women in the United States and all over the world, not merely a
particular group of women in an individual state. "If an activity signif-
icantly affects the interests of a constituency broader than a state's
population, then the state government cannot protect effectively that
contingency's interests. ' 341  A state cannot effectively protect
women's interests against subordination when Internet obscenity is
posted in one state and read in another state. The impact of obscenity
on the Internet is felt by women all across the nation, thus making the
problem a national issue.
Congress' power to enact such a federal statute is found within the
Commerce Clause. Congress is acting to protect the nation's economy
from injuries that arise from gender-based threats of violence inherent
within the continued subordination of women. 342 Furthermore, as
338. See http://www.hotbox.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2000); http://www.whitehouse.com (last
visited Dec. 16, 2000) (portraying two "adult" Internet sites that are often considered by some
people as "soft porn").
339. Gilbert, supra note 330, at 1731.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1731.
342. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners in Violence Against
Womens Act. Draft (on file with author).
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recognized in Lopez, Congress has the ability to "protect the national
economy from the injurious effects of systematic, pervasive discrimi-
nation designed to prevent a historically ... subordinated group from
equal and effective participation in economic life. ' 343 Thus, since the
statute is consistent with the requirements enumerated in Lopez, it
must be upheld as constitutional.
Without a federal statute regulating obscenity on the Internet
women will continue to be subordinated. In allowing obscene writings
and pictures on the Internet, which embody "woman hating," the sub-
ordination of women, or sexual torture, the judiciary and the legisla-
ture are supporting these embodiments of woman hating and
misogynist ideas as acceptable societal attitudes.344 "This new In-
ternet community, [which the judicial system is part of,] is without any
true geographic boundaries, [and] does not fit within the current
framework for analysis of community standards [and] the regulation
of interstate 'distribution' of obscenity. ' 345 Therefore, the inability to
regulate obscenity on the Internet will only lead to a dramatic increase
in the amount of obscenity available through the Internet and a signif-
icant increase in the subordination of women. The continued failure
of our legal system's ability to keep pace with the rapidly advancing
cyberspace will impede the technological scope of the Internet, and in
all events make effective legal control difficult. 346 In 1998, adult sites
constituted a one billion dollar industry. In addition, more than one-
half of the requests on search engines are "adult orientated. ' 347 This
amount will only increase over time. However, if there is a federal
statute employing a national standard of review applicable to all
states, any person who puts obscene material on the Internet would be
prosecuted, and society would begin to realize that speech which con-
tinues the subordination of women rips the moral fabric of society into
shreds.
343. Id.
344. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING, supra note 1, at 192; KENNEDY TAYLOR, supra
note 256, at 51-52.
345. Rebecca Dawn Kaplan, Cyber-smut: Regulating Obscenity on the Internet, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y. REV. 189, 189 (1998) (tracing "the history and purpose of community standards law and
suggest[ing] two possibilities for determination of community standards with regard to electronic
erotica ...").
346. In fact, even today the courts have difficulty overseeing use of the Internet due to the
fact that it has over 60 million users of material from worldwide sources with vast, diverse, and
privately interconnected networks of communication.
347. Leland, supra note 51, at 61.
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VII. CONCLUSION
From a public policy perspective, it is imperative that the United
States Congress enact a federal statute regulating obscenity on the In-
ternet. The Jane Doe Story is only one of many obscene Internet
postings or e-mail transmissions that can be found on the Internet.
However, it only takes one story for a woman's attention and social
status to be caught and mutilated by the impact obscenity has on her
physical, emotional, and social status. As demonstrated by the words
of Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz, obscenity on the Internet is overwhelm-
ingly misogynistic and its impact on women is subordinating. Hence,
the need to put men and women on the path to equality will only
begin to be furthered by the enactment of a federal statute regulating
obscenity on the Internet.
This Note has explored the history of the Internet, First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and the current law of obscenity. Furthermore,
this Note argued, through an analysis of Baker and Alkhabaz, that the
court in Alkhabaz erred in not finding the Jane Doe Story and the e-
mails as true threats to women in our society. The court also erred in
not recognizing that the Jane Doe Story was obscene under the First
Amendment.
In recognizing the immense harm that obscene Internet transmis-
sions, such as Alkhabaz's Jane Doe Story, have on women, this Note
proposed a constitutional federal statute that introduced a national
standard of review to regulate Internet obscenity, in addition to the
present contemporary standard of review presented in Miller.348 Ac-
cordingly, this federal statute defined obscenity, mandated a national
standard of review, and listed acts constituting violations of the fed-
eral statute. This federal statute would allow all states to apply the
same standard of review to material, and to decide whether the mate-
rial is obscene.
More importantly, this federal statute reinforced the idea that ob-
scenity is not protected by the First Amendment regardless of how it
is communicated. Upon the implementation of this federal statute
regulating obscenity on the Internet, women will be able to raise their
heads from under the moral fabric of society and proclaim: "We are
someone, we are equal, and we are continuing to fight against the sub-
ordination of women!"
Melanie Pearl Persellin
348. 413 U.S. at 24.
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